

THE SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY



Vol. XXIV

SEPTEMBER, 1943

No. 2

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Published By
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Second-class postage paid at Austin, Texas,
March 2, 1919.

THE SOUTHWESTERN QUARTERLY is the
Southwestern Quarterly. The sub-
scriptions are \$5.00 a year or 55 cents
per copy. All orders may be addressed
to the Editor, University
of Texas, Austin, Texas. All
communications should be addressed to Ruth
University of Texas.

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TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL
SCIENCE ASSOCIATION:

I wish I could talk with you personally about the problems now confronting the executive officers of the Southwestern Social Science Association. Our principal problem during the war is the production and financing of the *Quarterly*. The production is very satisfactory. The financing is, however, becoming increasingly more difficult. The cost of publishing has risen and our income has declined. We can do nothing to lower costs without injury to the *Quarterly* but we can secure a greater income.

Members—many members have allowed their membership to lapse by failure to pay their dues. They have not had the stimulus and enthusiasm of the convention to remind them that dues must be paid if the organization is to function. A great majority, I am sure intend to continue their membership and aid in fostering the Association. They have simply allowed thoughts of the war and of war efforts to crowd out the inclination and time to remit their dues.

It behooves us, each of us, to contact these former members and influence them to return to the association. But, in order that responsibility for such efforts may be specific and personal certain members are being asked to conduct a campaign to enlarge our membership by bringing back ex-members and enlisting new ones among eligible persons who have recently come into the Southwest. Please help these committeemen in their work. The *Quarterly* may continue for years and develop into undreamed of importance. While the present emergency may be merely an incident in the life of the magazine and the Association, let us now come to their aid in the hour when they can be seriously hurt for not only the present but the future by lack of support and interest.

Wiley D. Rich, President
3318 Hanover St., Dallas, Texas

The following individuals are being asked to act as committeemen to lead and organize the effort to secure new members:
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The Laissez-Faire State in Relation to the National Economy*

CLEM LINNENBERG, JR.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

To the student of present-day social problems, the study of classical economics is useful in much the same way as is the study of anthropology. By examining the interplay of judgment and action in circumstances different from our own or rather far removed from ours in time or space, we increase our command of the judgment process. When we remember that we too are sons of Adam, parallels will appear, or, where those are lacking, some less precise but no less instructive similarities in habits of mind. This paper is an examination of the ideas of four great classical economists of Britain—James Mill, John Ramsay McCulloch, Nassau William Senior, and John Stuart Mill¹—concerning the proper relation of the state to the national economy. The classicists are celebrated chiefly for their advocacy of *laissez faire*. But their notions about the relation of the state to the national economy were less simple than their more casual twentieth-century disciples and foes believe. If McCulloch sometimes reminds us of Westbrook Pegler, Stuart Mill was in a sense a New Dealer, uncertain whether to plump for half a loaf or to cast off compromise and advocate all this and heaven too.

The Mills, McCulloch, and Senior conceived society to be atomistic. The idea runs throughout their writings, though somewhat modified in the works of Stuart Mill. Each human atom functions independently of the others and, as regards economic endeavor, it acts in its own interest. The first of the "four elementary propositions" which Senior thought an ample ideological foundation for political economy was "That every man desires to obtain additional wealth with as little sacrifice as possible." These

* This discussion will be published in two sections. The second will appear in the December issue. Ed.

¹ Their dates of birth and death were: James Mill, 1773-1836; McCulloch, 1789-1864; Senior, 1790-1864;; Stuart Mill, 1806-1873.

utilitarians were aware, of course, that group loyalty and kindred feelings exist. They knew that, even if a man were to reason like an isolated individual, he could not *act* with perfect freedom merely by virtue of the absence of deliberate restraint from outside. They did not think that the individual always acts, in economic matters, in his own interest. Indeed, it was a certain barrier to such behavior (*viz.*, ignorance) that was responsible for their great regard for education. But they felt that by and large the atomistic conception of society was accurate. If, their opinion held, the rules take into account the tone-giving qualities of society, they will bring better results than if they are based, instead, on trivial exceptions.

The conception of society as a collection of rational, self-seeking individuals has as an indispensable aspect a certain theory of knowledge. The utilitarians regarded knowledge on any particular subject as an absolute thing, without any really qualitative variations. Such a theory of knowledge, today typified by behavioristic psychology, is a part of an atomistic conception of society just as an organismic conception of society includes a theory that knowledge is a very complex thing, each element of which is to be understood only in relation to many other elements. According to the latter theory of knowledge, now typified by gestaltism and Freudism, no one completely *misunderstands* any topic for to know *something* about it is to understand it in part; and no one completely understands anything, for intelligence is finite, relationships infinite. If any of the four writers here under consideration had a noticeable inclination toward this second theory of knowledge, it was Stuart Mill. But he had learned the other viewpoint from his father so well that he could never depart from it very far.

In 1943 we are poignantly aware of totalitarianism, in which the state is not merely instrumental but is itself the supreme end of human action. To the classicists the state's proper task was the furtherance of the wellbeing of its citizens; *i.e.*, they accepted Bentham's basic social objective, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It would have been less necessary twenty years ago than it is now to mention that they had this idea—which many of us, with them, regard as extremely important but very obvious. But the war in which we are engaged makes us notice

willy-nilly our enemies' principle that the material welfare of citizens is entirely subordinate to the predatory power and glory of the state. The war likewise brings a reaffirmation of our own views. The contrast is not simply between an atomistic ideology and an organismic ideology. It is a contrast also between an idea of material wellbeing of the nation that does not necessarily involve a prejudice against the wellbeing of other nations, and an idea that involves the glorification of *relative* welfare. The latter aim can be promoted quite as well by harming your neighbor as by directly helping yourself.

"It is almost impossible," Senior declared, "to overrate the importance of the art of government. With the exception, perhaps, of morality, it is the most useful of the mental arts; . . . with no exception whatever, it is the most extensive." Its aim, he said, is to promote human happiness. The only wise and moral course for a government is to do *all* that is right and to resist *all* that is wrong; but expediency (tempered by respect for life-interests) makes a thing just. The government should never refrain from a reform on the ground that yielding this time will bring on further demand for reform. Moreover, institutions ought to be attacked or defended solely on the basis of the benefit they afford the public. Legislators should respect economic science, for this body of knowledge shows how to foster the production of wealth—the pursuit of which is to most people "the great source of moral improvement." Indeed, he declared, wealth itself promotes moral and intellectual betterment, virtue, and happiness.

In the opinion of McCulloch, national prosperity depends more on "a wise system of public economy" than on the amount and sort of natural resources the nation possesses. Clearly, he had in mind governmental policy rather than governmental structure; he declared that "It is not . . . so much on its political organization, as on the talents and *spirit* of its rulers, that the wealth of a country is principally dependent." Because political economy—including, for example, value and distribution theory—is of great practical significance, legislators should be thoroughly acquainted with it. Thus they can contribute toward the improvement of the nation's civilization, for wealth makes refinement possible. The promotion of "the public advantage" is, so he clearly implied, the

one great aim on which all governmental policy should focus. Likewise McCulloch was voicing the sentiment of his school when he condemned mercantilism on the ground that it was a utilization of government by the merchants and manufacturers for the purpose of preying on the public (and each other). These views of Senior and McCulloch were shared by James Mill.

It is in the writings of Stuart Mill that we find the most comprehensive and best organized statements in classical economics on the proper scope of government. We sometimes hear, he remarked, that governments should give protection against force and fraud but should do nothing else. The enforcement of contracts—and, even more, discrimination as to which contracts shall be enforced by law and which shall not—are not the giving of protection against force or fraud. The fashioning and enforcement of inheritance laws are not protection against force or fraud. Yet all these activities, he believed, are obviously within the proper sphere of government. “. . . the admitted functions of government embrace a much wider field than can easily be included within the ring-fence of any restrictive definition, and . . . it is hardly possible to find any ground of justification common to them all, except the comprehensive one of general expediency; nor to limit the interference of government by any universal rule, save the simple and vague one, that it should never be admitted but when the case of expediency is strong.” He and the other nineteenth-century classicists believed that the government should promote the well-being of its citizens, but that there is a presumption in favor of *laissez faire* as the means to this end.

Stuart Mill sought to distinguish between the principle of *laissez faire* and that of liberty. The first pertains to matters primarily economic. On the basis of *laissez faire* there is, for example, a general presumption against governmental price-fixing, even though “. . . trade is a social act,” affecting “the interest of other persons, and of society in general.” The other principle concerns matters primarily personal, such as freedom of religion and “freedom of opinion,” prerequisites to individual dignity. It also applies in matters which relate to interference with trade but which are “essentially questions of liberty.” Thus Mill condemned as improper restrictions on *personal* liberty the liquor-prohibition law

of Maine, the Chinese prohibition against the importation of opium, and (prima facie) all other trade restrictions intended "to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity."

When a man's independence of action in a personal matter will bring "a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage," either to another individual or to the public, liberty does not preclude restraint. Liberty precludes the restraining of a man for his own good unless he otherwise will unwittingly act contrary to his own desires. "If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river."

A sharp dichotomy between body and soul, between the bipedal economic unit and Man, could not be used unfailingly by a philosopher so comprehensive in interests as was Stuart Mill. At times economic *laissez faire* and personal liberty found themselves fusing into one principle. In consequence the tale of the hapless traveler and the unsafe bridge was one of the instances in which Mill implied assent to an incalculable amount of social and economic legislation.²

Adam Smith's argument for freedom of international trade was taken over bodily by all four of the men whom we are considering. But Stuart Mill for many years held to the infant industries theory. In his old age he declared he still believed his opinion had been "well grounded," but "... experience has shown that Protectionism, once introduced, is in danger of perpetuating itself through the private interests it enlists in its favor . . ." Hence he now

² On the general scope of activity proper for the state, see James Mill, *Commerce Defended* (London, C. and R. Baldwin, 1808), 118-119; McCulloch, *Discourse on the Rise, Progress, Peculiar Objects, and Importance of Political Economy* (Edinburgh, Archibald Constable and Company, 1824), 3, 19, 30-31, 73, 77-79; Senior, *Industrial Efficiency and Social Economy* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1928), vol. i, pp. 12-13, 31, 42; vol. ii, pp. 28-29; *On National Property*, 3rd edition (London, B. Fellowes, 1835), 13, 127-128; *Introductory Lecture on Political Economy* (London, J. Mawman, 1827), 12; Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, 1871 edition (London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1929), book v. Chap. i; *On Liberty* (London, John W. Parker and Son, 1859), especially chaps. i, iv, v.

preferred "some other mode of public aid to new industries, though in itself less appropriate."

McCulloch declared (somewhat as a corollary to the general free trade doctrine) that commercial wars and commercial treaties are worse than useless. Aside from being expensive, such wars fail to accomplish their aim (of national economic gain), for they are a particular form of interference with that *freedom* of trade essential to the greatest prosperity. He inveighed against commercial treaties, with little internal consistency in his remarks. His only lucid objection was the general one, the applicability of which he did not show, that free trade is most conducive to gain.

McCulloch, Senior, and Stuart Mill went considerably further than Adam Smith in qualifying the general rule of domestic *laissez faire*. But to the extent that they and James Mill, like Smith, argued the case directly from the standpoint of production, no one of the four stated better than he the case for that general rule. With a flair for invective which, a century later, could have won him fame as a newspaper columnist, McCulloch remarked: "No man of sense will ever believe, whatever be the amount or character of the estimates and evidence to the contrary laid before him, that articles manufactured by Government servants can be furnished as cheaply as those produced by private parties. Those who believe in the possibility of such a thing may believe, on quite as good grounds, in the truth of Mormonism, spirit-rapping, or any other quackery or folly of the day." Senior thought that governmental regulation of private industry was, in general, not only a useless expense but pernicious. It ordinarily increases rather than diminishes the evils to which it addresses itself, he said, for the self-interest of the parties to a transaction gives them an understanding and a motivation which officials lack. One of McCulloch's bases of complaint against regulation was that the public inspectors are afforded an opportunity to receive bribes. Indeed, there was a general presumption on the part of James Mill, McCulloch, and Senior that governments are inevitably corrupt and inefficient. The individual is saved from inefficiency only by his self-interest, and from dishonesty chiefly (if at all) by the self-interest of other individuals. All four writers shared Hobbes' opinion of mankind, although Stuart Mill was rather inclined to think human nature would some day be

much better and that even in his own day French workmen had a noticeable measure of altruism.

If these four writers added nothing to Smith's attacks on governmental action in domestic economic affairs as long as their attacks were directly from the standpoint of production, they went beyond him when they explicitly used distribution theory as an argument against interference in the process of distribution and against other sorts of interference. Usury laws are unwise because they seek to enforce a situation at variance with that which the "natural law" of interest dictates. As Stuart Mill declared, the rate of interest is determined by supply and demand. Neither the public nor the borrowers can be benefited by a legal maximum. A legal maximum lower than the competitive rate causes some lenders to withdraw their capital from the market. Some of those who will not take the legal maximum lend it at a rate sufficiently higher than the ordinary competitive rate to compensate for the added risk. Certainly they can find borrowers, he stated, for the borrowers with good security to offer have already gotten all the legal-rate funds.

The Malthusian doctrine of population was a favorite basis for the libertarian arguments of the four writers. There were of course instances of a joint use of that doctrine and of distribution theory. For example, the wages-fund doctrine, a standard-of-living theory, and the dismal principle of Malthus enabled McCulloch to condemn laws designed to keep down wages. In his opinion the maximum-wage laws of 1350 and 1352, passed after the Black Death, were quite unnecessary. Truly enough, the shortage of laborers would have induced a rise in wages. But each laborer's family would have then increased enough in size that its standard of living would have subsided to the customary level. In the next generation the increase in the number of laborers would have caused a fall in wages. Moreover, he insisted, the two laws were objectionable not only because they were supererogatory, but also because the poor had "an unquestionable right" to the temporary rise in wages. The economists under discussion, except Stuart Mill, usually assumed that whatever happened in the absence of governmental interference was *right*, in a moral sense. This idea rested, apparently, on no firmer foundation than an assumption that economic "freedom" is the normal state of affairs ("normal"

in the encomiastic sense). It is normal because the individual is thought to be logically prior to the group.

James Mill used the Malthusian theory of population and the Ricardian rent doctrine, which also was community property of the classical school, as the foundation of his argument against governmental intervention to increase the rate of accumulation of capital. The *form* of intervention, he said, is obvious and simple. The government could levy an income tax and either lend the capital obtained or employ it directly. This increase in the amount of capital would bring a population increase. The latter would necessitate an extension of the margin of cultivation. Therefore profits-per-cent would fall. Granted that real wage rates remained constant, the capitalists would become so poor as to be little better off than the laborers. If sales of land were infrequent, society would presently have only a few people of means, the great land-owners. If sales of land were infrequent, there would presently be *no* people of means, for the land (the only very remunerative property) would be held in extremely small portions. By implication, and without indicating any reason, he simply *assumed* in this argument that infrequency of land-sales makes for largeness of holdings, or he assumed that it has no effect on size of holdings. Similarly, he assumed that frequency of land-sales makes for smallness of holdings. He went on to say that the presence of only a few people of means is exceedingly destructive of human happiness; indeed, that this need not be proved. The total absence of people of means, he said, is also very bad, for a leisure class is needed to supply leaders, rulers, intellectuals. Moreover, a leisure class (if it be of middling station rather than of the highest) obtains, "as a class, the greatest sum of human enjoyment"; hence the total of human happiness is greatly increased by the existence of such a class.

McCulloch, Senior, and Stuart Mill all condemned laws designed to suppress labor unions. They believed that unions could almost never cause wages to be higher than the rate dictated by the current state of the wages fund and the number of laborers. But if the prevailing wages are below this level, they argued, certainly it is wrong to impede the workers in any peaceable efforts to raise them up to it. If wages are at or above this level, the workmen's

efforts are bootless. Men will come in from other trades to take the places of the strikers. Laws against combinations (trade unions) do not affect wages in the long run any more than combinations do. "The habitual earnings of the working classes at large," wrote Stuart Mill, "can be affected by nothing but the habitual requirements of the laboring people . . ." But the market rate of wages, he said, is not fixed by some automatic instrument but by what Smith called the higgling of the market. And the laborer who strikes singly has no chance of success. He does not even know whether the state of the market permits a rise, except by "consultation with his fellows, naturally leading to concerted action." Similarly, McCulloch declared that united action is the only means whereby wages "can be speedily and effectually raised to their *just level*," and hence the prohibiting of combinations is "committing injustice in behalf of the strong, at the expense of the weaker party!" The workman's strength and skill are his capital, McCulloch and Senior stated. He has a sacred right to dispose of this property as he likes, so long as he does not interfere with the same sort of freedom on the part of others. McCulloch observed that a thousand capitalists may combine and dispose of their property in whatever way they decide in their collective capacity is most advantageous. It is incongruous, he felt, to question the existence of the same right on the part of laborers.

Because of Stuart Mill's obvious sympathy for the common man and because of his willingness to discuss the conditions of the wage bargain in factual terms, it is reasonable to believe that today he perhaps would not even oppose majority rule in collective bargaining. He believed it at least conceivable that the state might properly enact a maximum hours law for adults if it was to their true advantage. The law would be justified, he said, on an *assumption* of a mutual agreement among all the workers, and the *probability* that such a mutual agreement if not enforced by the state would be kept by so few of the workers that those keeping it would not benefit. Certainly his idea concerning the liberty of a man about to step unintentionally into the river is pertinent here. The non-union man desires work and wages; it is not the detriment of his fellows that he desires. To force him to cooperate with them is to give effect to both his desire and theirs. Even if he did wish

also to harm his fellows, he has no right—on Mill's own principles—to do so.

But in Stuart Mill's day the discrepancy between the power of a business unit and the power of a workman was not so great as it is today, and the legalization even of unions which were not permitted to coerce their own members was still rather recent. Hence we find him and McCulloch and Senior all bitterly attacking the coercion of non-members as an interference with freedom. The "Interference" sometimes took very violent forms—partly, one suspects, because this coercion had to be effected without the aid of the law and indeed in contravention of the law; partly, no doubt, because unionization had not yet become very popular among British workmen. Senior told of mayhem, murder, and destruction of property by textile workers in Manchester and Glasgow and by lumber sawyers in Dublin. Such deeds, although they should not be judged out of context, underlie the bitterness of these economists concerning the coercion of non-union workers. Senior also complained of employers' encouraging their competitors' employees to strike. In a report made to the Home Office in the 1830's, he recommended strengthening of the law against these two practices. State interference was necessary to preserve individual freedom.³

Indeed, the most taken-for-granted functions of government were justified by an argument that the government must perform certain positive and negative acts which will make possible or make more effective the economic endeavor of individuals acting almost entirely without either restraint or assistance. Of the circumstances which McCulloch named as requisite to an emergence from barbarism, one is security of property and another is the accumu-

³ On *laissez faire*, see James Mill, *Elements of Political Economy*, 3rd edition (London, Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1826), pp. 59-65; *Essay on the Impolicy of a Bounty on the Exportation of Grain* (London, C. and R. Baldwin, 1804); McCulloch, *Treatises and Essays*, second edition (Edinburgh, Adam and Charles Black, 1859), 486, 490; *Treatise on the Circumstances Which Determine the Rate of Wages* (London, Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1851), 75-81; *Discourse on . . . Political Economy*, 85-86; *On Commerce* (London, Baldwin and Cradock, 1883), 81-85; *Memorandums on the Proposed Importation of Foreign Beef and Live Stock* (London, Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1842); Senior, *Industrial Efficiency*, vol. II, 301-302; *Historical and Philosophical Essays* (London, Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1865), vol. II, 121-122, 133-158; Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, 926-937, 963-965; *Letters* (London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1910), vol. II, 200-201.

lation of stock, which of course depends on the first-named circumstance. In one of his more extreme *laissez-faire* moods James Mill strongly denounced as a waste of national income, a curb on the national production, and an impediment to national happiness every governmental expenditure above that necessary for the maintenance of "law and order" (by which he probably meant simply "order," since "law" might be feudal or mercantilist or near-anarchist, in scope and aims). The propriety of *this* governmental function he did not question, and it is inconceivable that he should ever have done so. Indeed, there is excellent ground for inference that he went along with the other classicists here discussed, in their belief that the enforcement of (some) contracts and the making and enforcement of regulations concerning the inheritance of property are governmental functions which should be taken for granted. How are these beliefs to be explained? It is not enough to say that these men were practical and respectable and hence incapable of desiring so unfamiliar a situation as anarchy. They entertained some opinions which in their day were considered outrageous. James Mill ventured a discernibly favorable remark about birth control in his "Colony" article at a time when most respectable Britons thought the practice unspeakably vile. Stuart Mill spoke vigorously for women's rights when any one was a crackpot who did not recognize that God intended wives to be quasi-chattels. McCulloch was one of the earliest advocates of the right to strike.

That the classicists took for granted a few governmental functions is to be explained not entirely on grounds of prejudice but also in terms of intellectual conviction. Looking at man as he existed, they believed these measures necessary to human happiness. Obviously, harm to life and limb must be minimized if the Benthamite ideal is to be promoted. Force is requisite to this endeavor. And all of them believed that material improvement, which promotes human happiness, presupposes the governmental maintenance of internal security and order. If property is unsafe, they asked, who will be stimulated to improve technology? Who will accumulate? And if no one accumulates, the wages fund will be small and hence wages will be low. If property is unsafe, who will invest in useful works? Will the poor develop those habits of frugality, perseverance, sobriety, and responsibility and

that desire for a higher standard of living which could check population growth and tend to raise wages? If property is unsafe, what persons will dare to consume ostentatiously and in consequence to vie with each other in the pursuit of riches which will enable them to spend yet more lavishly? Insecurity of person also amounts to insecurity of property. And not only should person and property be secure from *private* maraud. A plundering government, said Stuart Mill, is even worse than private brigands. "Insecurity *paralyzes* only when it is such in nature and in degree that no energy of which mankind in general are capable affords any tolerable means of self-protection. And this is a main reason why oppression by the government, the power of which is generally irresistible by any efforts that can be made by individuals, has so much more baneful an effect than almost any degree of lawlessness and turbulence under free institutions." (*Italics supplied.*)

The government must use every reasonable means, said McCulloch, to enforce contracts. If it is at all backward in the matter, confidence will diminish and hence the number of contracts will diminish. He felt that this would assuredly be bad for the national economy.

Stuart Mill remarked that the government necessarily has some sort of inheritance law; indeed, no function of government is "more completely involved in the idea of civilized society." He indicated that such a law includes some sort of rules restricting bequeathal. What if the government does *not* restrict bequeathal? His reply that this never happens is really an observation that something has not occurred rather than an explanation of why it cannot occur. McCulloch declared that the government must decide what effect will be given to the directions in wills; and he was on comparatively safe ground, for in effect he was saying that the government must give some sort of protection to the property rights which it tolerates. Thus he was saying simply that in this specific instance the government must as usual protect property ("must" in the sense of obligation). He strongly opposed restrictions on bequeathal to individuals, other than the English law according to which the testator could prescribe the ownership of his property no further in the future than the twenty-first birthday of the first unborn heir. Accumulation, he argued, must be encouraged.

Younger sons of landowners must be stimulated to try to get fortunes comparable to the family fortune, all of which will customarily be left to the eldest son if the government does not (as in France) interfere. The lavish spending of the eldest sons will induce the impecunious to strive for money to spend in like manner. Children will be better behaved if they have no state-given assurance of inheriting property from their parents. But if the testator's wishes control property very long after his death, the prescribed administration of it may presently, through unforeseen circumstances, prove unwise.

Along with McCulloch, Stuart Mill disliked the French law requiring that the bulk of a parent's property pass to his children in equal shares. One of Mill's objections, however, was that this is not the most effective, most equitable way to preclude large hereditary fortunes. How can society keep inherited property from collecting in large masses and yet avoid restricting the amount of property a testator may bequeath to any one? Mill replied that the law should limit the amount which any given heir would be allowed to inherit, the maximum being whatever suffices for "a comfortable independence."

This proposal, Mill believed, is ideal but is unlikely to be seriously considered as yet. The compromise which he thought would, although in lesser measure, further the same rather equalitarian goal, was like McCulloch's ideal, almost *laissez faire*. In this compromise proposal, Mill differed from McCulloch chiefly in his wish as to what use the testators would make of the discretion allowed them: He did not share McCulloch's aristocratic hope for bequeathal of all of the family fortune to the eldest son but, instead, wanted each parent to divide his property among his children on the basis of need. There is certainly no positive reason, he said, for encouraging disparity of wealth by means of the inheritance law (e.g., by the English requirement of primogeniture with respect to realty, in case of intestacy). Indeed, "... the more wholesome state of society is not that in which immense fortunes are possessed by a few and coveted by all, but that in which the greatest possible numbers possess and are contented with a moderate competency, which all may hope to acquire . . ." Moreover, if large fortunes be desirable to stimulate the envious to exertion, earned wealth serves as an even greater stimulus than does in-

herited wealth. Self-interest he said, will prevent landed property from being broken up into pieces too small for the most efficient cultivation. Division of the inheritance does not force division of the land. Some of the heirs can sell to others. Or the land can be owned jointly, as is frequently done in France and Belgium, where division of the inheritance is required. Primogeniture, which discriminates on the basis of an accident, is unjust. It also encourages great landowners to try to keep up a pretense of greater affluence than is really theirs. Entails are bad because they do not permit the degree of freedom essential to effective management. The more easily land may be sold, the more productive it becomes. Also, Mill proposed that no bequests to persons as yet unborn be permitted. The rationale of these views was that if self-interest is to make for the greatest efficiency physically possible, no social barriers against transfer of property should be allowed without a positive showing of cause.⁴

If men are to guide their destinies by reason, the utilitarians believed, they must be literate and they must have the *will* to guide their destinies along the path to ever-greater happiness. Literacy is essential to the securing of facts about the world in which the individual is pursuing his self-interest—facts adequate to an understanding of where his interest lies. The will for self-betterment is necessary because—well, chiefly because the utilitarians assumed that man naturally has it, and they were building up a whole body of doctrine based on this assumption.

Of the devices which Senior described as "The only effectual and permanent means of preventing the undue increase of the number [of paupers] to be maintained," one was the raising of the moral and intellectual character of the working class and another was the creation in this class of habits of prudence, self-respect and self-restraint. McCulloch expressed a like view. Moreover, he felt that the poor if educated would be better able to realize the worthlessness of the societal nostrums which are so often offered to them. The Home Rule agitation in Ireland was for him a

⁴ On the taken-for-granted functions of government, see Jams Mill, *Commerce Defended*, 118; McCulloch, *Discourse on . . . Political Economy*, 95; *Principles of Political Economy*, 5th edition (Edinburgh, Adam and Charles Black, 1864), 188, 194-205; Senior, *Industrial Efficiency*, vol. 1, 79, 210; Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, 221-229, 797, 882, 889-897.

horrible example of the sort of thing to which an educated people would have turned a deaf ear. Stuart Mill, in a moment of optimism unusual even for him, wrote that "A slight change in education would make the world totally different."

In education and attitudes, the prevailing condition of the poor was shocking to a rationalist mind. Many were illiterate; few had received education of a quality which justified the imparting of it. Teachers of the laborers' children were grossly ignorant. The curricula for poor children, where extending beyond the three r's, were collections of useless information designed to be memorized. The schools provided in compliance with the Factory Act were dirty, badly ventilated holes into which unwilling children were crowded in order that their employers could get the school attendance certificates required for textile-mill employment. On the other hand, "Where the poor are left to provide themselves for the education of their children," said Senior, "the provision which in England they usually are able and willing to make does not deserve to be called imperfect, for imperfection implies that something has been done; it is null." The dame schools and day schools so provided were at least as bad as those provided by employers. Among the laboring classes, Senior thought, parents could not be trusted to supply their children with education. In making this point, he poured out some of his bitterest vituperation. He illustrated the workmen's intelligence with a story of a laborer who once complained to him that his children had turned out badly. And yet, the worker said, "... there is not a better father than I in the parish. I beats them whenever I gets sight of them; I beats them as I would not beat a dog." Stuart Mill, calmer than Senior, declared that governmental intervention in education is justifiable because the consumer's interest and judgment are not an adequate security for the commodity's goodness. Moreover, in the absence of state intervention, judgment would be exercised not by the consumers but by their parents, whose interest is contrary to that of the children. Such state action, he believed, is not a deprivation of liberty.

"Is it not almost a self-evident axiom," said Stuart Mill, "that the state should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen?" If the

parent does not voluntarily provide such mental training, the state should see that the child gets it—at the parent's expense insofar as possible, for to bring a child into the world if there is not a fair chance of the parent's being able to provide it not only with food but also with education, is a moral crime against the child and society. Mill would have the state enforce education among the whole population, rather than just among the working class. Senior specified that compulsion was unnecessary among the middle and upper classes.

Senior strongly urged a thorough revision of curricula. Instruction should be practical. By this he did not mean that it should be trade instruction. He favored, for example, religious instruction of a sort that would have an obvious bearing on deportment. He wanted the training schools for teachers to provide instruction in political economy, presumably so that persons trained there could give the rudiments of the science to *their* pupils. He and the other classicists arguing for the education of the poor believed that the inclusion in elementary instruction of a bit of economic science would help to prevent the laboring population from attempting to flout economic law. For example, the classicists believed that employers and employees alike will benefit if the latter know that a strike is not the only prerequisite to a wage increase.

In nineteenth-century England, compulsory school attendance and governmental support of schools were regarded as two separate issues. However, McCulloch, Senior, and Stuart Mill insisted on the need for state financial aid to working-class education—indeed, beyond the meager help then afforded in England. Because most of the laborers fail to purchase their children an education, said Mill, they do not include this item among the necessary expenses for which their wages must provide. Hence the general wage rate is not high enough to bear this expense. It must be met out of taxes.

As if the principle of utility itself were not an adequate theoretical basis for a tremendous variety of social reforms, Stuart Mill provided in his discussion of education a pattern adaptable to innumerable uses. There are few burdens hitherto borne by the individual which cannot analogously be transferred to society. If

such burdens are a part of his living expense (as measured in terms of money or in terms of pain) and regularly recur in the group, even infrequently, they ought to be covered by his wages even though at present they are not. To the *laissez-faire* principle "From each according to his ability" there is thus added the not so *laissez-faire* idea, "To each according to his need."⁵

⁵ On education, see McCulloch, *Principles of Political Economy*, 5th edition, 396-401; Senior, *Industrial Efficiency*, vol. II, 328-353; *Suggestions on Popular Education* (London, John Murray, 1861), *passim*; *Three Lectures on the Rate of Wages* (London, John Murray, 1830), p. v; *Letters on the Factory Act* (London, B. Fellowes, 1837), *passim*; Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, 953-956; *On Liberty*, ch. v; *Letters*, vol. II, p. 386.

The Army Doctor in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1775-1860

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For a number of years the belief has prevailed that prior to the Civil War, army surgeons were unworthy of the great medical profession which today commands universal respect. Only too frequently do unthinking individuals speak disparagingly of early army doctors, with the result that many people believe the practice of medicine and surgery in the army was largely experimentation upon unfortunate victims by wielding a crude knife after a blow over the head had rendered the patient insensible to pain. To be sure, such practices were not unknown in the army.

One must remember, however, that medicine had made little progress in the eighteenth century. It was not until 1841 that the first reports of any extensive use of quinine in the army were made by Assistant Surgeons J. J. B. Wright and Charles McCormick.¹ In 1846 Dr. W. T. G. Morton, a dentist at Boston, revealed the anaesthetic properties of sulphuric ether. A year later the American Medical Association was formed to provide physicians with a super-state organization, a forum for expressing opinion, and a common professional conscience.

Furthermore, one should view American medicine in its relation to that of contemporary Europe. It was not until after 1856 that the humanitarian aspects of war appeared in the person of Florence Nightingale, whose services did much to alleviate the sufferings of soldiers in the Crimean War. Medical science did not take on a new meaning until the invisible world was opened by Pasteur's discovery of bacteria and Lister's application of that science to aseptic surgery. Doctors possessed little degree of certainty until the X-ray was perfected. Not until these advances were made

¹ "Statistical Report of the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States," (Compiled from the Records of the Surgeon General's Office from January 1839 to January 1855), *Senate Executive Document*, No. 96, 34 Cong., 1 sess., 637.

could private physicians and army doctors display any marked degree of efficiency.

American medicine and surgery in the eighteenth century reflected the state of those sciences in Europe—particularly in Great Britain. Medical men placed their faith in cathartics, emetics, blisters, bloodletting, opium, and the bark—all of which were remedies of the day.² Naturally, when compared with modern medical science, the methods and remedies applied by doctors during the colonial era seem primitive, but in reality, army doctors utilized the facilities of their day to the best of their knowledge. Army and medical schools had been established throughout the country, and the medical knowledge of the day was available to physicians.

Doctors who accompanied scientific and military expeditions were usually educated men who commanded the respect of their associates. Prior to 1775, colonial militia organizations, whether large or small, took their own surgeons with them. "American medicine grew up during the Revolution. In spirit at least the physicians were no longer colonial doctors of the backwoods; they were now doctors of a new country, the United States, and as such, they turned with a new vigor . . . to meet the scientific advances of the nineteenth century."³

When the United States resumed hostilities with Great Britain in 1812, the brancard or wheelbarrow was replaced by litters constructed of blankets, the sides of which were nailed to poles nine or ten feet long. In both the Revolution and the War of 1812 surgery was rarely employed. Anaesthesia and antiseptics were unknown, and blunting of sensation was done by means of alcohol and opium. Since most doctors had not dissected, little was known about anatomy, and, as might be expected, mortality was high.

Surgeon James Mann boasted that he kept infection out of his hospitals by frequently whitewashing the walls, sanding the floors, and paying constant attention to cleanliness. The infrequency of operations is astounding. Out of 11,955 admissions to hospitals there were seven operations, two amputations, one injection of a

² Louis C. Duncan, *Medical Men in the American Revolution, 1775-1783*, Carlisle Barracks, Penna., Medical Field Service School, 1931, p. 7.

³ Howard W. Haggard, *The Doctor in History*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1934, p. 305.

hydrocele, and four ligations of the saphena vein for varix.⁴ Dr. William Beaumont gives a vivid account of the scene at the harbor of York Town in 1812 when he speaks of surgeons "wading in blood, cutting off arms, legs, and trepanning heads to rescue their fellow creatures from untimely deaths . . . It awoke my liveliest sympathy, and I cut and slashed for 48 hours without food or sleep. My God!"⁵

One of the greatest discoveries in medical history had as its background Ft. Mackinac to which Dr. Beaumont was ordered in 1820. Two years later, a Canadian half-breed, Alexis St. Martin, critically wounded by the accidental discharge of a gun, "received the whole load of buckshot at close range in his left side . . . The chest was torn open, the left lower lung, the diaphragm and the stomach lacerated. The stomach contents came out mixed with blood, shreds of clothing and bone-splinters . . . Ten months later the wound was still open and a gastric fistula persisted . . . Beaumont decided that he could make use of this fistula for experiments. Here was an ideal opportunity to find out what went on in the stomach."⁶ After many trying months of studying the process of digestion, he published his *Experiments and Observations on the Gastric Juice, and the Physiology of Digestion*. Beaumont's observations threw light upon the digestive processes, and "Every physician who prescribes for digestive disorders," says Dr. V. C. Vaughan, "and every patient who is benefited by such a prescription, owes gratitude to the memory of William Beaumont . . ."⁷

The War of 1812 illustrated the need of a more efficient medical service, and on April 14, 1818, the Medical Department was formally established. Owing to a rather unexplainable opposition in the army and to an indifference on the part of Congress, it had a difficult struggle in achieving rational organization and securing

⁴ P. M. Asburn, *A History of the Medical Department of the United States Army*, N. Y., Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929, p. 38. (Based on James Tilton's report of medical affairs in the Third Military District, which included New York City, for the entire period of the War of 1812).

⁵ Jesse S. Myer, *Life and Letters of Dr. William Beaumont*, St. Louis, C. V. Mosby Co., 1912, p. 44.

⁶ Henry E. Sigerist, *American Medicine*, N. Y., W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1934, pp. 97-100.

⁷ Fielding H. Garrison, *History of Medicine*, Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Co., 1929, pp. 506-07; Vaughan was Director of the Hygienic Laboratory at the University of Michigan from 1887-1909.

appreciative recognition. Prior to the Civil War the Medical Department was unable to function efficiently since its early days were characterized by conflicts of authority and frequent changes in personnel. Its officers had not been trained for anything larger than post practice or peace time administration, and by 1860 the Department was filled with old men.⁸

During the interval between the War of 1812 and the War with Mexico in 1846, the army was actively engaged in defending the frontier. Small settlements scattered throughout the West required protection from the British, Spanish, and Indians. Then, too, there was the need of safeguarding trains of immigrants which were constantly trekking westward. Numerous Indian attacks during those decades necessitated the organization of companies of dragoons which were stationed at western posts along the frontier.

Asiatic cholera, a scourge which usually struck without warning, proved more deadly than the Sauk and Fox in the Black Hawk War of 1832. Ft. Dearborn succumbed to panic, and army surgeons deserted their posts. Lieut. P. St. George Cooke reported that "Ft. Armstrong was converted into a hospital, whence all that entered were soon borne in carts, and thrown confusedly—just as they died, with or without the usual dress—into trenches, where a working party was in constant attendance . . ."⁹ Orders were given for sobriety, cleanliness, and greater attention to diet. Flannel shirts, flannel drawers, and woolen stocking were recommended by the senior surgeon. Other cholera epidemics followed in 1849, 1850, 1851, 1852, 1854, and 1855. During the '52

⁸ Two works dealing with the history, activities, and progress of the Medical Department are Ashburn, *op. cit.*, and James A. Tobey, *The Medical Department of the Army*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1927. An excellent source, although rare, is Harvey E. Brown, *The Medical Department of the United States Army from 1775-1873*—published by the Surgeon General's Office in 1873.

⁹ P. St. George Cooke, *Scenes and Adventures in the Army*, Philadelphia, Lindsay and Blakiston, 1857, p. 193; Lynch, Charles, "The Scope of Teaching that Should be Followed in the Newly Established Chair of Hygiene and Sanitation in our Military and Naval Schools, and the Practical Results to be expected Therefrom," *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, Vol. XLIV, 195; *Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Society*, Vol. VII, pp. 365-66; P. G. Lowe, *Five Years a Dragoon*, Kansas City; Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., 1906, pp. 187-213.

epidemic at Ft. Riley, pine tar was burned as a disinfectant, and the smoke and fumes floated into the open windows.

The government maintained a full medical department during the Mexican War, and Surgeon General Thomas Lawson personally served in the field with General Scott. A full medical staff which accompanied General Taylor served with distinction. It was in the War with Mexico that the first medical officer, John S. Griffin, served on the Pacific.¹⁰

Of 100,454 men sent to Mexico, 1,549 were killed outright or else died from wounds, while 10,986 died of disease. Seven times as many died from the latter as at the hand of the enemy.¹¹ Unbearable were the sufferings of the Americans at Camargo, Mexico where barren hills of limestone cut off the breeze. Clouds of dust filled the air, and temperatures ran up to 112° F. Scorpions, tarantulas, plagues of small frogs, mosquitoes, and centipedes added to the misery of the men. Days of sweltering were followed by cool nights and heavy dews, and the groans of the sick could be heard on all sides. The "‘dead march’ was played so often that, as an officer said, the very birds knew it."¹²

A Dr. Sanderson, physician to the Mormon Battalion, experienced some unforeseen difficulties. In times of sickness he distributed medicine, but when the patients were beyond his sight, they put the medicine anywhere but down their throats. Mormons had their own ideas about medicine and only too willingly heeded the admonition of their leader, Brigham Young, "If you are sick, live by faith, and let surgeons' medicine alone if you want to live." When Sanderson learned how little his efforts were appreciated, he compelled his patients to take medicine from an old iron spoon in his presence. This caused no little trouble in the Mormon Battalion, and the controversy continued throughout the war. All deaths were attributed to Sanderson's "quackery." Young's letter of August 19th on medicine read in part, "It was customary every morning for the sick to be marched to the tune of 'Jim along Joe'

¹⁰ Tobey, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹¹ Louis Duncan, "The Comparative Mortality of Disease and Battle Casualties in the Historic Wars of the World," *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, Vol. LIV, pp. 164-65; also consult Justin H. Smith, *War with Mexico*, N. Y., Macmillan Co., 1919, Vol. II, 318, 512.

¹² Smith, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 211.

to the doctor's quarters, and take their portion from that same old iron spoon, and the doctor 'threatened with an oath to cut the throat of any man who would administer any medicine without his orders.' " Many times Mormons drank large quantities of water to neutralize the effects of Sanderson's "calomel and arsenic."¹³

No anaesthesia were employed by the army during the War with Mexico, and it was customary for military surgeons to amputate limbs and dress stumps on the field of battle or as soon afterwards as possible. This avoided great suffering of pain when, after a battle, the wounded were usually hurried from post to post in carts and wagons for days.

The decade of the forties proved an awakening for American medicine. Out of the Mexican War came the movement for pure drugs and medicines, when a select committee of Congress held that adulteration of medicines was the cause of the lamentable mortality in the War.¹⁴ In 1848 the American Medical Association endeavored to secure Congressional legislation against the importation of drugs and medicines.

Worthy beginnings were made in recording scientific data which were later used to advantage. The first medical statistics of the army were published under the title, "Statistical Report of the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States."¹⁵ This was one of the greatest contributions of the Medical Department prior to the Civil War, and information of both scientific and historical interest is contained therein. For example: of 5,000 recruits examined for service in 1850 and 1851, there were 3,516 foreigners as compared to only 1,484 native Americans; of 2,675

¹³ For an amusing account of Sanderson's experiences with the Mormon Battalion see Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of California*, San Francisco, The History Co., Publishers, 1886, Vol. V, pp. 479-82. Two other worthwhile sources on the activities of the Mormon Battalion during the War with Mexico are Henry Tyler's *Concise History of the Mormon Battalion in the Mexican War, 1846-1847*, and Henry W. Bigler's *Diary of a Mormon in California*.

¹⁴ *House Reports*, No. 664, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 20.

¹⁵ These statistics were compiled from the Records of the Surgeon General's Office. The volume which covers the period from 1839 to 1855 was published as *Senate Executive Document*, No. 96, 34 Cong., 1 sess., while the volume which covers the period 1855-1860 was published as *Senate Executive Document*, No. 52, 36 Cong., 1 sess. Hereafter, any reference to these documents will be cited merely as *Stat. Report, 1839-1855* or *Stat. Report, 1855-1860*.

from Great Britain and her Dependencies 2,113 were from Ireland alone; 678 came from Germany. Of 16,064 men examined in 1852, 13,338 were rejected for being minors, unable to speak English, intemperate, undersized, or troubled with varicose veins. Americans had three epileptics per thousand, while the English, Irish, and general Europeans had four. The same ratio applied to gonorrhea and syphilis. The ration was uniform for such diseases as spinal curvatures, old injuries, defective vision, and ulcers. As for the number who passed the examinations and requirements, the Americans, who ranked highest, were followed by the Germans and the British.¹⁶

It may be said that the army doctor was just as efficient in caring for the sick and wounded on military campaigns as the commanders were successful in attaining their military objectives. Today army surgeons are responsible for sanitation in the army, but in the nineteenth century their duties consisted of examining recruits and enlisted men for defects in sight, hearing, and speech; drunkards were rejected.

Every morning at 7:30 the soldiers had to report to the doctor's tent where the names in the "sick book" were read one by one:

"Well, Jones, how do you feel this morning?"

"I don't see that I get much better, Doctor."

"What! No better! This is the fourth day that you have been reported sick."

"The doctor then feels his pulse, perhaps tells him to stick out his tongue, which he half the time forgets to look at, and then dismissing the patient, marks down a prescription opposite his name, and calls up the next."

"Well, Bennet, what's the matter with you?"

"I've got a scalded foot, sir."

"How did that happen?"

"The coffee-kettle upset upon it as I was making up the fire."

"You ought to take more care! This is the third time that you've complained within a month! Go to your quarters, sir!"

The doctor then went down the list in much the same manner with pretty much the same prescription whether the patient was suffering with rheumatism, mumps, fever, or fracture. In all cases, calomel was the grand restorative, and little attention was paid to the quantity administered.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Stat. Report*, 1839-1855, pp. 625-30.

¹⁷ James Hildreth, *Dragoon Campaigns to the Rocky Mountains*, N. Y., Wiley and Long, 1836, pp. 114-15.

Another aspect of the army doctor's duties, aside from war time service, was his work at army posts. Frequently, when soldiers were transferred from southern to northern posts, they contracted pneumonia. Too often the selection of the camp site was left to the discretion of engineers rather than to that of army doctors. Surgeon B. I. D. Irwin, in his sanitary report from Ft. Buchanan, Arizona in 1859, spoke of malarial diseases which he attributed to the proximity of swamps and quagmires as well as to heaps of stable manure, the presence of pigpens, cowpens, and root houses wherein were often found heaps of putrid garden vegetables.¹⁸

Diseases of the digestive organs, the respiratory system, and the urinary and genital organs were frequently encountered by army doctors. Eruptive fevers, cholera, brain and nervous disorders, pneumonia, abscesses, ulcers, wounds, injuries, poorly baked bread, and even nostalgia or "homesickness" took their toll. Surgeon S. P. Moore of Ft. Brown reported that yellow fever was usually treated by general and local bloodletting; calomel combined with quinine; sinapsims, mustard pediluvia, and enemata.¹⁹ To counteract the effects of a tarantula bite, Assistant Surgeon Andrew K. Smith at Ft. McKavett applied a poultice, a large dose of sulphate of magnesia, five grain doses of quinine, and ten drops of laudanum every four hours, whereupon the patient became delirious. The doctor then administered fifteen grains of quinine and thirty drops of laudanum—which had a "most happy effect."²⁰

Still another rôle which the army doctor played was that of accompanying scientific expeditions. Renowned among such expeditions was that of Lewis and Clark. Deprived of the services of a commissioned army doctor, the leaders were obliged to act as physicians, and whenever physical ailments occurred, Captain Clark relied upon Rush's Pills, then in vogue, and if the results were unsatisfactory, he resorted to Scott's Pills. Peppermint, laudanum, salts, jalap, and tartar emetic were used for colic and dysentery. In the far Northwest along the Columbia and Kooskooskee Rivers the expedition's supplies became so low that the leaders found it

¹⁸ *Stat. Report*, 1855-1860, p. 214

¹⁹ *Stat. Report*, 1839-1855, p. 357.

²⁰ *Stat. Report*, 1855-1860, p. 189.

necessary to render medical aid to the Indians in return for food.²¹

Accompanying the Pike expedition was Dr. John H. Robinson, who served not only as physician to the party but as interpreter to the Indians. In February of 1807 the lack of game left the men but a small chance of surviving the winter, and Robinson left Pike on the Rio Conejos to proceed alone to Santa Fe—presumably, to procure supplies for the expedition.²²

One of the most common maladies with which expeditions had to contend was scurvy. The official journal of the Lewis Cass expedition reveals that forty per cent of the men died of this dreaded disease in the summer of 1820 before relief was found by making a strong decoction of hemlock boughs. The cause of this affliction was attributed to the men's sustenance on salted provisions without any vegetables.²³ Other diseases frequently encountered by expeditions were bilious and typhoid fevers, fractures, dislocated shoulders, boils, and ailments resulting from drinking strange and impure water. The usual method of treating intermittent fevers was that of administering large draughts of whiskey and black pepper before the accession of the cold stage, following which the Peruvian bark was taken.²⁴

Of interest to the historian are fleeting glimpses of the West which army doctors occasionally recorded at a time when most Americans were too busy to record the social history of their own country. As might be expected, their chief object of interest was the American Indian. Dr. J. G. Cooper, who accompanied a western expedition to survey a route for a railroad, wrote of the prevalence of smallpox among the Indians with whom vaccination had proved unsuccessful. The Indians also suffered greatly from chronic inflammation of the external eye, apparently caused by the irritation of smoke in their poorly ventilated huts, atrophy of the muscles of

21 For the experiences of the Lewis and Clark expedition consult Reuben Gold Thwaites, *The Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition*, N. Y., Dodd, Mead and Co., 1904.

22 Stephen Harding Hart, and Archer B. Hulbert, *Zebulon Pike's Arkansas Journal*, Stewart Commission of Colorado College and the Denver Public Library, 1932, footnote on p. 170.

23 "Papers of James Duane Doty," *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, 1895, Vol. XIII, 214.

24 Reuben Gold Thwaites, *Early Western Travels*, Cleveland, The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1905, Vol. XVII, 85-86. (Experience of the Stephen H. Long expedition).

the leg, a result of their infrequent use in walking, and consumption, probably encouraged by poor clothing and shelter.²⁵ Assistant Surgeon J. Frazier Head, in his Ft. Riley report of 1852, commented upon the prevalence of pleurisy, pneumonia, bronchitis, smallpox, and measles among the Indians. There was hardly any syphilis, although gonorrhea was common and of a virulent character which resisted all ordinary means of treatment.²⁶

In a report from Ft. Snelling in 1833, Dr. Nathan S. Jarvis commented upon the Indian's love of food and smoking. "I believe if an Indian were dying, provided he could move his jaws, he would eat if you presented him food. . . . I have known them repeatedly to go without food four or five days. Their only solace then is smoking, in which last occupation the better part of their life is spent. He smokes when he is hungry or dry, hot or cold, lazy or fatigued, from friendship or anger, hatred or revenge—in fact, he smokes every half hour when awake and will get up every hour during the night to indulge in a puff of his beloved 'kinnikinick.'" ²⁷

Assistant Surgeon Robert Bartholow regarded the physiognomy of Mormons as one "compounded of sensuality, cunning, suspicion, and a smirking self-conceit. The yellow, sunken, cadaverous visage; the greenish-colored eyes; the thick, protuberant lips; the light forehead; the light, yellowish hair; and the lank, angular person constitute an appearance so characteristic of the new race, the production of polygamy, as to distinguish them at a glance."²⁸

On the subject of intemperance in the army, Surgeon R. H. Coolidge wrote from Ft. Riley, Kansas in 1857, "From the statements of convalescents and from other sources, I am satisfied that *three quarts* of whiskey was the customary daily allowance of quite a number of the men; one quart, as they expressed it, being required to 'set them up before breakfast.' It appeared to me that larger quantities of opium were necessary in the treatment of these excessive drinkers than in ordinary cases of delirium tremens."²⁹

²⁵ *Sen. Exec. Doc.*, No. 78, 33 Cong., 2 sess., 1854, Vol. I, 179-81.

²⁶ *Stat. Report*, 1839-1855, pp. 64-65.

²⁷ Nathan S. Jarvis, "An Army Surgeon's Notes of Frontier Service, 1833-48," *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, Vol. XXXIX, 135.

²⁸ *Stat. Report*, 1855-1860, Bartholow's Report of 1858 from the Utah Territory, 301-03.

²⁹ *Stat. Report*, 1855-1860, p. 97.

Such was the life of an army doctor with his diverse duties ranging from medical services to examining recruits, carrying on experiments prescribed by the Medical Department, acting as a natural scientist or an interpreter to the Indians, and recording observations and impressions of the country he traversed. While today emphasis is placed on prevention, in the pre-Civil War days preventive measures were slighted, and when disaster struck, the army doctor was expected to perform a feat of magic by quickly placing everything in order. "To cure"—that was the army doctor's main duty.

If one remembers these things and at the same time regards American medicine in relation to that of contemporary Europe, he will not be so likely to censure the army doctor to whom an unpaid debt of gratitude should be accorded. Many army doctors abandoned the securities of a normal domestic practice in order to brave the rigors of the frontier in an effort to bring some measure of relief to American soldiers, explorers, and immigrants. It is safe to say that most army doctors did their best with the limited facilities at their disposal—that they performed their many duties as efficiently as commanding officers discharged theirs. What more could have been asked of them?

THE NEW IMPERIALISM

Latin American Public Utility Investment, A Case Study

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It has long been recognized that Latin-American investments present a knotty policy formation problem. The countries to the South have been starving for capital while investment institutions of the United States possessed funds of a much greater magnitude than current investment opportunities required. The prevailing conditions were not, however such as to make the capital requirements of Latin America also investment opportunities for the bankers of the United States. During certain phases of the development of the Western Hemisphere, South-American capital needs have given the appearance of investment opportunities, but in most instances, expected profits proved to be mirages. When monetary profits were made, the immediate pecuniary advantage was often outweighed by the harm wrought upon United States and Latin-American relations.

These facts have discouraged many to the point where they accept the defeatists point of view and label the problem insolvable. Their statement of the existing conditions may be summarized in this wise: Latin America needs capital and we have more than we can use, but conditioning forces and intermediary problems prevent Latin-American demand and North-American supply from becoming effective. Entirely too many Latin-American economic experts are prone to leave the problem in this unhappy condition not attempting to analyze and suggest methods of removing the difficulties of which they speak.

It is the opinion of the writer that a successful and intelligent Latin-American investment policy can be formulated if the problem is attacked in a scientific manner. The purpose of this brief article is restricted to indicating some of the more obvious factors that must be considered in formulating a scientific policy to be used in guiding a program of Latin-American *public utility* invest-

ment. It is fully realized by the writer that a study of this limited scope can indicate only the broadest outlines and that its main purpose must be the providing of a basic procedural outline. Since the writer is of the opinion that any policy which might produce profits but does not preserve favorable relations is deficient and unacceptable, the investment policy here advocated stresses the maintenance of favorable international relations.

The Latin-American countries are without exception desirous of obtaining additional public utility services and in turn the construction of these services invariably requires the purchase of materials and the employment of skilled workers from foreign countries. In order to make the necessary material purchases and meet salary payments it is necessary that the Latin-American nation either have a substantial favorable balance of payments or obtain grants of credit from foreign nations. Both methods, of course, require in the long run a substantial favorable balance of payments but there is an important difference. In the first case imports are obtained as a result of the expenditure of foreign exchange accumulated from the operations of normal commercial relations while under the second arrangement materials are obtained by the use of exchange acquired from borrowing transactions.

The second method brings about an unfavorable balance of trade in the country constructing new public utility properties and a favorable balance in the country furnishing the materials. It also permits rapid development of public utility properties, but in accomplishing this it brings about a number of conditions which are definitely unfavorable to relations between the two countries. When a nation obtains materials from a foreign country, under conditions which do not at the same time bring about a sufficient development of export industries to provide adequate exchange to pay for the goods imported, it means that in the future the nation will have to either restrict its consumption of foreign goods or develop greater export markets. However, most public utility investments tend to hinder the development of a favorable balance of trade. This is especially true in regard to Latin-American countries whose principal exports to the United States are tropical-agricultural products and minerals. Increase of railroad and power

facilities might have considerable effect upon the development of wider and more extensive foreign markets for mineral products but would probably have very little upon outlets for agricultural products. But the development of electrical utilities and, to some extent, other utilities have a definite tendency to increase the demand for foreign made goods. The demand for tropical agricultural products in the United States, being rather inelastic, would not be appreciably changed as the result of new investments in Latin America. On the other hand the demand in Latin America for products made in the United States is highly elastic. New public utility investments will decrease the cost of operating large numbers of modern conveniences which will in turn increase the sale of the various products for which the cost of operation has been decreased. Utility development then is not likely to have a great positive influence in increasing the sale of Latin American goods to consumers in the United States while it would have a marked tendency to increase the sale in Latin America of products made in the United States. This development would tend to bring about exchange difficulties and all the various inconveniences and bad relations which develop from such a situation.

For this reason if funds to build public utility properties are obtained by credit grants it might be expected that the Latin-American country constructing the new utility property will have its exchange balance subjected to a much more serious strain after the utility is built than during the period of building. For two increases in demand for exchange will develop at once; one to repay the loan, and the second to pay for additional products for which the demand has increased as a sequela of the utility development. This greatly increased need for exchange can be met only by a very substantial increase in exports or by the borrowing of additional funds. The first solution could be accomplished only under the most favorable circumstances; the second brings default and ruin in its wake.

If the utilities are built on a pay-as-you-go basis, that is paid with exchange arising from normal commercial relations it would be possible for the construction of the utilities to proceed at a pace greater than the rate at which a bonded indebtedness could be repaid. In this case the increase in derived demand mentioned

above would be less of a drain upon the nation's stock of foreign exchange. Also, the development of derived demand would proceed more slowly and would have therefore a greater tendency to facilitate the development of domestic industries which in turn would be able to provide at least a portion of the new products demanded. The establishment of domestic industries to satisfy the demand would in turn facilitate a continuous increase in the public utility facilities without reaching an exchange crisis and the disagreeable circumstances and bad relations which are certain to develop from such conditions.

A progressive government is always anxious to bring about rapid development of public utility properties. It usually appears that large scale foreign borrowing will most readily accomplish this intent. But, looking at it from a longer run point of view it appears that this short term celerity does not always forecast rapid development of a nation's utilities. This observation is especially true of those Latin-American countries in which the utility investment does not materially increase the production and sale of exportable commodities. The case of the Mexican railroads is an example of swift utility development that at the present seems to have retarded further utility development in that country. In the case of Argentina, however, it appears that it was desirable to borrow large sums of money to make possible a swift extension of her railroad system. The result in that country was an expanding export trade, which was not the case in Mexico.

When a nation makes large future monetary commitments such as are required by extensive utility development, it is most important that the government avoid the letting of contracts during periods of high prices. If the utilities, however, are built with funds borrowed from abroad the construction is very apt to take place during this very period of high prices with repayment attempted during a period of low prices. This situation brings about later demands for debt reduction; often debt default occurs; and citizens of the borrowing countries become convinced they are paying for more than they had received. All of these conditions tend to bring about a deterioration of relations. They also make it more difficult for the debtor nation to continue its program of utility development. If, however, the utilities were financed under

a pay-as-you-go policy they would be paid for in money of the same value as that used in determining the price of the article purchased. The present tendency of various currencies to fluctuate violently on the international exchanges makes this an important consideration.

Public utility expansion or any other development which requires the purchase of large quantities of foreign goods has a tendency to create conditions which will bring about overemphasis of export industries. This type of development is apt to be most pronounced, of course, when the nation produces an exportable product with an expanding market. Cuba, during the War 1914-'18, was a Latin-American example of this situation. Under such conditions it would be highly desirable that the country use its available exchange to develop its utilities and refrain from borrowing. It would be advisable also that a considerable portion of available exchange be used to build industries to supply the derived demand created by the utility development. An overexpansion of export industries is always undesirable; for it makes a country vulnerable to the uncertainties of fluctuating international conditions. A nation which finds itself as a result of such fluctuations with a maladjusted economy is apt to blame its condition upon the country which provided the stimulus for the expansion. If public utility construction is considered to be the reason that a nation has an over expanded export industry, undesirable international relations are likely to develop.

The analysis of public utility investment up to this point indicates that under all conditions where the utility does not increase production of a good or goods with a permanent and expanding foreign market, the relations between the two countries would be most favorably affected if the utilities were developed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Much diplomatic friction arising out of an unbalanced economy may be thus avoided.

Public utilities are particularly dependent upon the goodwill of the government under which they operate. The nature of the service they provide is such that utilities are found to be always either operated by or closely regulated by the government. Control of transportation utilities is required if a group is to have

political power in a nation. In cases where these properties are owned by citizens of a foreign nation one party to the dispute is certain to believe that the foreign power is favoring its opponent. If the properties are destroyed during disturbances, or if their services are requisitioned, it is practically impossible to avoid the presentation of claims by the foreign owners. Both of these contingencies are certain to create bad relations between the countries in which the nationals involved hold citizenship.

Further the rates charged by utilities are always, to a greater or less degree, under government control; and these rates are of tremendous importance in determining whether the investment will be profitable.

When it is realized that the government must have some sort of control over the rates of utilities and that the right to set rates is the right to destroy or create property values it becomes apparent that utility properties are always at the mercy of the policy that might be adopted by any more or less transitory Latin-American Government. For example, the Mexican Government has used its power to determine rates as a rather effective weapon to deprive utility property of its dividend paying capacity.

The fact that utilities must be closely regulated by the government and the fact that they are in the center of every political intrigue has put them first on Professor Staley's list of types of investments that cause diplomatic difficulties.¹ International complications regarding foreign investments in utilities arise largely as the result of a country's developing its utilities and import requiring industries more rapidly than the nation is able to expand export payments. Thus it is apparent that if a nation were willing to limit its imports to the quantity of its exports the problem of foreign owned industries need not arise.

It would appear then that the development of utility properties in various Latin-American countries at a rate more rapid than exports permit is an undertaking best accomplished under auspices of the governments concerned with a mutual understanding of the difficulties involved. If the export of capital is provided by private American sources it is necessary that interest and sinking fund

¹ Eugene Staley, *War and the Private Investor*, 1940.

payments begin immediately. It is also necessary that the payments be transferred at regular intervals. Both of these conditions are met only with great difficulty by the typical Latin-American nation. Also, as has been previously mentioned, it is to be expected that utility properties will be closely regulated by the government of the country in which they are located. The regulation of private properties by governmental agencies develops frictions under the most nearly ideal conditions. The various agencies of the United States governments in their attempts to control utility properties, have become involved in a continuous series of litigations.

The circumstances surrounding the close regulation by a Latin-American Government of an utility owned by foreigners, from a nation with a different legal organization, are not such as would encourage the development of friendly relations. In order for the relationship to operate without friction, it would be necessary for the country in which the investment is placed to experience a period of continuous and mounting prosperity or to exercise restraint of the type that neither Latin-American Governments nor American investors have shown evidence of possessing in the past.

The activities *en évidence* of the Import-Export Bank during the past three years appear to be pointed toward the lending of funds for capital construction on a basis which is conducive to friendly relations. The danger of this type of lending is that it will be dominated by political considerations and loosely formulated social aims. The political loan is certain to have unfavorable repercussions on the economy of the borrowing country and would practically guarantee non-repayment. Also, a loan extended primarily to improve the living conditions existing in a nation, however socially commendable it may be, seldom brings forth sufficient funds to meet interest and sinking fund requirements. Pecuniary considerations which dominate private lending are, however, apt to lead to results just as undesirable as those indicated when the motives are primarily political or social.² The difficulties which

² "It is undeniable that many of the foreign loans now in default would never have been made if the bankers had been guided solely by conservative financial principles rather than by pecuniary considerations." From *America's Experience as a Creditor Nation* by John T. Madden, Nadler, Marcus, and Harry C. Suvain. p. 231 (1937).

have arisen from business loans have been partly due to the very fact that political and social considerations existed, but were not recognized, and that therefore the loans have been treated as though they were extended on a purely investment basis. It is impossible for private individuals to extend loans on any basis other than that of investment, yet all international loans are to a greater or less extent of a political and social nature.

All loans extended for the construction of public utilities in a country which does not have a substantial export balance or which does not export products the sale of which would be increased by the development of the utility are of necessity unsound investments and should not be undertaken by individuals. The Federal Government, however, could extend funds to countries which do not possess the necessary prerequisites required of a sound investment. In fact, the loan might be a sound investment if extended by the Federal Government but would not be if the funds were advanced by private individuals. Since the Federal Government is becoming a large purchaser of goods of all types, it could quite easily shift its purchases in a manner to make possible the repayment of a certain foreign loan. A government might also receive payment in a number of forms that while not of a monetary nature, would be just as valuable as a specie payment.³ The transfer problem which is so important in the repayment of a foreign loan can be greatly alleviated by certain simple governmental actions.⁴ Also, because the funds loaned by the Federal Government are owned by all the people, a Federal loan might make repayment easier by making more obvious the economic unsoundness of certain trade restrictions and thus engendering greater public support for measures leading toward a freer international movement of goods. However, this type of public opinion did not evolve as a result of loans of the United States during 1914-18.

In summary it may be stated that the borrowing of funds by the Latin-American countries to bring about a more rapid development of their utility properties than would be possible by the expenditure of export surpluses may be a desirable type of economic

³ The provisioning of troops or the ceding of territory to be used as air bases would be current examples.

⁴ Madden, Nadler, Suvain, *op. cit.*, p. 19-20.

development, yet it would *not* be desirable for the funds to be provided by private American Citizens unless the conditions met certain very specific requirements. Under practically all conditions it is advantageous for the preservation of good relations, and for sound economic reasons, that the funds extended to enable Latin-American countries to construct utility properties more rapidly than would be possible upon the pay-as-you-go basis should be made available by an United States Government agency as the result of intergovernmental understanding.

However, despite the fiscal and diplomatic advantages of governmental international lending a realistic consideration requires the recognition that it is actually TVA imperialism which has as its primary purpose the improvement of the standard of living enjoyed by the citizens of the country in which the utility properties are developed. This new imperialism would have as its "objectives not a high return on capital but rather a flourishing trade built upon the basis that would be created by the rising standard of living in the capital importing country."⁵

⁵ Robert B. Bryce, (minister of Finance, Canada) "Basis Issues in Postwar International Economic Relations" *American Economic Review* Vol. XXXII No. I, Part II, Supplement, March 1942, p. 172-173.

A Demographic Analysis of First and Second Generation Mexican Population of the United States: 1930

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For two decades many Americans have been cognizant that all is not well with the Mexican in the United States. Particularly after 1920 the so-called "Mexican Problem" was impressed upon the people by the increasing size of the Mexican population coupled with declining immigration from Europe. The presence of large numbers of Mexicans in this country has occasioned serious social, economic, and political problems which have been reflected in discrimination, segregation, misunderstanding, social distance, and even intermittently in conflict. The upsurge of popular interest in the status and welfare of the Mexican in connection with these difficulties is indicated by the fact that between 1920 and 1930 *Readers' Guide* listed a total of 51 articles bearing on the Mexican in the United States as contrasted with only 19 during the preceding decade.

Recent international and domestic developments have given new impetus to our endeavor to understand and improve the situation of the Mexican in this country. For the past few years relations between the United States and Mexico have been marked by increasing cordiality. This better understanding has flowered into the military alliance now binding these nations together and pitting them against the Axis powers. In addition to becoming a party to military collaboration, the Mexican state has demonstrated its willingness to contribute to the solution of one of our most vexing domestic problems—the shortage of farm labor. In August, 1942 the Governments of Mexico and the United States signed an agreement setting forth provisions whereby Mexicans could enter the United States to serve as agricultural laborers. Under terms of this agreement substantial numbers of Mexicans have already entered the United States. These developments have generated an

intense desire among United States citizens to understand and aid the Mexican making his home within our borders.

In approaching the problem it is necessary to know some of the characteristics of the Mexican population of the United States. Significant and useful data on the size and make-up of the group have been collected and published by the Bureau of the Census. For the Census of 1940, however, the "Mexican" classification was dropped. Consequently the only bench mark now available for a comprehensive demographic treatment of the Mexican population in the United States is the Fifteenth Census, 1930. The aim of this article is to present some demographic characteristics of the Mexican population of the United States as shown in returns of that Census.

Certain limitations are imposed upon this analysis by the nature of available data. Of fundamental importance is the fact that the definition of Mexican used in the official enumeration leaves much to be desired. The Bureau of the Census classifies as Mexican:

"All persons born in Mexico, or having parents born in Mexico, who are not definitely white, Negro, Indian or Japanese."¹

Essentially this category includes Mexican immigrants and their children. However, inspection of the Census returns reveals that a considerable number of native Mexicans of native parentage were also enumerated. Briefly, the Mexican population of the 1930 Census embraces a complete inventory of first and second generation Mexicans and a substantial number of those of later generations. Despite the omissions resulting from this definition it appears that the 1930 Census classification yielded a valid sample of the universe of "Spanish" or "Mexican" culture population.

One other point should be stressed; enumerators under the Census rules were instructed to enumerate persons at "their usual place of abode"—that is, at their permanent homes or regular lodging places.² Hence, persons were not in all cases counted in the places where they happened to be found by enumerators. Because of its migratory character this instruction is particularly

¹ Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, Population II*, Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office, 1933, p. 27.

² *Ibid.* I, p. 11.

important in analyzing the Mexican population.³ The enumeration by states and counties necessarily counts only the number who have established residence therein.

A large and widely distributed Mexican population in the United States is of relatively recent origin, although a Spanish culture population has persisted in territory now a part of this Nation for over 400 years. At no Census year before 1910 had the foreign-born Mexican population exceeded one per cent of the total foreign-born population of the United States. Between 1910 and 1920 the number of residents of this country born in Mexico increased from 221,915 to 486,418, or from 1.6 to 3.5 per cent of total foreign-born population. By 1930 the 641,462 foreign-born Mexicans in the United States constituted 4.5 per cent of total foreign-born population.

On April 1, 1930 the Mexican population of the United States, as enumerated by the Census, stood at 1,422,533. This count ranked the Mexicans as the third largest "racial" group in the Nation, exceeded only by whites and Negroes. Of the 1930 number, 616,998 (43.4 per cent) were foreign-born, or first generation Mexicans; 541,197 (38.0 per cent) were native born of foreign or mixed parentage, or second generation Mexicans; and 264,338 (18.6 per cent) were native born of native parentage. The first two of these figures should represent a fairly complete count within the respective categories whereas the third component, actually excluded by the very definition employed by the Bureau of the Census, could be no more than a fraction of those born of native parents.

Some indication of the actual size of this latter group is afforded by data taken from Sanchez who estimated New Mexico's "Spanish" population, including all generations, at 203,729 in 1930.⁴ This figure exceeds the Mexican population of New Mexico as returned in the 1930 Census by 144,389 and indicates underenumeration of 70 per cent. However, it is to be expected that New Mexico might

³ See Selden C. Menefree, *Mexican Migratory Workers of South Texas*, Division of Research, Work Projects Administration, Washington, United States Printing Office, 1941.

⁴ George I. Sanchez, "School Census Distribution in New Mexico for (August) 1931," *New Mexico School Review*, January 1932, pp. 18-9; see also Sigurd Johansen, *The Population of New Mexico: Its Composition and Changes*, New Mexico Experiment Station Bulletin 273, June 1940, pp. 21-2.

show the greatest underenumeration of any of the states since a Spanish culture population has persisted there for 400 years. Considerable underenumeration is to be expected in Colorado for the same reason.

It is possible that underenumeration of third and subsequent generations of Mexicans approximated 200,000 in 1930. If this figure is added to the actual count of Mexican population as returned by the 1930 Census the Mexican population of the United States, including all generations, approached 1,650,000.

The Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, enumerated 1,861,400 white persons of Spanish mother tongue, most of whom were Mexicans. The Spanish speaking population of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas at the time of the 1940 Census was 1,570,740.⁵ These figures indicate that little change occurred in the Mexican population of the United States between 1930 and 1940.

Mexicans are not evenly distributed over the United States. (See Fig. 1) Generally speaking they cluster in a belt approximately 150 miles wide extending from San Francisco south along the Pacific Coast, then inland along the Mexican Border through the States of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas to the Gulf of Mexico. Farming areas deeply affected by this concentration include the Texas winter garden truck and fruit areas, the cotton culture area of the Rio Grande Valley, the sparsely populated grazing areas of the Mexican Border from Texas to California, the Imperial Valley of California, the Salt River Valley of Arizona, the great citrus fruit area of Southern California, and finally, the San Joaquin Valley of Central California where intensive fruit and vegetable farming prevails.⁶

Importance of Mexicans in the Southwest results not only from a large absolute number but also from the large proportion that they constitute of the total population. Mexicans constituted 26.2 per cent of the population of Arizona, 14.0 per cent of that of New Mexico, and 11.7 per cent of that of Texas. Only two additional

⁵ Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940*, Series p-15, no. 1, Washington, D. C., June 9, 1942.

⁶ Consult Harold Hul McCarty, *The Geographic Basis of American Economic Life*, New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1940.

states had more than five per cent of the population classified as Mexicans, California with seven per cent and Colorado with six per cent.⁷

In some areas Mexicans made up the dominant segment of the population. In each of 24 counties extending from Santa Cruz in Arizona to Willacy in Texas more than half of the population was Mexican in 1930. In Texas these dominantly Mexican counties comprised a large part of the State south of San Antonio and form an area approximately three-fourths as large as that of the six New England States combined.

The economic role of the Mexican laborer in the Southwest is vital to the region but his influence transcends mere labor output. The cultural traits he has contributed are distributed throughout the dominant population group. Most of the radio stations give a large share of their time to Mexican music, spoken language is spiced by Spanish phrases, general diet contains a large number of Mexican dishes, and architecture comes under Spanish influence.

Outside of this general area of concentration it appears that Mexicans have made important numerical penetrations into northern parts of the United States. Considerable dispersions of them live in the sugar-beet areas of Colorado, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Utah, Idaho, Minnesota, and Montana. Large numbers are located in the industrial centers of Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Significant aggregations are scattered through the mining sections of western Colorado, and quite generally through the cattle country of Nevada and Wyoming. In Kansas and Nebraska they follow the main railroads.

Relative absence of Mexicans in the Deep South is striking. This phenomenon is not peculiar to the Mexican population as the South generally is characterized by a scarcity of foreign-born persons.⁸ Absence of Mexicans from this region is largely accounted for by the presence of a large supply of Negro labor in the South which precludes the need for additional numbers of cheap labor. It is true that a growing number of Mexicans workers have been used

⁷ It must be kept in mind that all these figures, based on Census counts, represent considerable underenumeration since not all native Mexicans of native parents are included. Particularly is this true in New Mexico and Colorado.

⁸ T. Lynn Smith, *The Population of Louisiana: Its Composition and Changes*, Louisiana Bulletin No. 293, November 1937, p. 4.

to pick cotton in the rich Mississippi Delta land but because of the highly seasonal and migrant character of their work it has not been their custom to settle in any great numbers through the cotton country. In addition the relatively late and partial industrialization of the South has limited the attractiveness of the area to outside sources of labor.⁹ In fact laborers have been leaving the South in great numbers.

In his homeland the Mexican lives predominantly in rural sections but in this country a large number reside in urban areas. In 1930, 51 per cent (723,428) of the Mexican population of the United States lived in urban areas¹⁰ contrasted with 33 per cent in the population of Mexico.¹¹ Twenty-five per cent of the Mexican population of the United States lived in rural-nonfarm areas and 24 per cent in rural-farm areas.

The traditional rural background of the Mexican has evidently been replaced to some extent by an urban and industrialized environment in the United States. This shift to the city among the Mexicans was especially marked in some states, such as, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and Missouri where more than 85 per cent was urban in 1930.

In the Southwest many Mexicans were also concentrated in cities. Fifty-seven per cent (58,291) of the population of El Paso and 36 per cent (82,373) of the population of San Antonio was Mexican. Los Angeles contained the largest urban aggregate of Mexicans in the United States numbering 97,116, though they constituted only 8 per cent of the total population. The largest Mexican population of any city outside the Southwest resided in Chicago numbering 19,362.

A definite trend toward greater urbanization of the Mexican is to be noted between 1920 and 1930. This can be tested only indirectly because of lack of data; since Mexicans constituted 70 per cent of the population classified as "other races" in 1920 and

⁹ Paul S. Taylor, *Mexican Labor in the United States, Migration Statistics IV*, University of California Publications in Economics XII, No. 3, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1934, p. 31.

¹⁰ Urban population, as defined by the Bureau of the Census, is that residing in cities and other incorporated places having 2500 inhabitants or more. The remainder is classified as rural.

¹¹ *Encyclopedia Britannica World Atlas*, Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica Inc. 1942, p. 37, Urban includes all towns of 2500 or more population.




Fig. 1

62 per cent in 1930, any trend in this category undoubtedly reflects a similar trend in the Mexican population. Therefore the fact that the proportion of "Other races" classified as urban population increased from 29 to 46 per cent between 1920 and 1930 is significant. The urban trend is highlighted by figures for specified cities. The Mexican population of Chicago grew from 1,265 in 1920 to 19,362 in 1930, that of Gary from 169 to 3,486 and that of Detroit from 683 to 6,515.

In spite of increased urbanization, only 51 per cent of the Mexican population in the United States was urban in 1930 in contrast to 56 per cent of the total population. Twenty-five per cent were in rural-nonfarm areas in contrast to 19 per cent of the total population of the United States.¹² The proportion classified as rural-farm population was approximately the same for Mexican and total United States populations.

The age distribution peculiar to the Mexican population can best be shown by comparison with the age distribution of the total population of the United States. Such distribution is important because age differences may reflect a variety of social, economic and political problems. That the Mexican population was relatively young is clearly shown by the fact that the median age for the group was 20 years in contrast with 26 years for the United States. In the age group under 5 years of age the figures were 15.1 per cent for the Mexican population and 9.3 per cent for the United States. In line with such differences, the Mexican population contained relatively fewer persons above 34 years of age. Only 1.4 per cent of the Mexicans fell within the age group 65 to 74 years in contrast to 3.8 per cent in the total population of the United States.

The Mexican population considered broadly embraced relatively large numbers of pre-school children (under 5 years) and children of school age (5-19 years) but relatively few persons of working age (20-64 years) and aged persons (65 and over). Fifteen per cent of the Mexican population was of pre-school age compared to 9 per cent in the total United States population, and respective

¹² For a detailed description of Spanish-American village life, see Olen Leonard and C. P. Loomis, *Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community, El Cerrito, New Mexico*, Rural Life Studies 1, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, November 1941.

percentages in the school age category were 35 and 30. Forty-eight per cent were of working age in contrast to 56 per cent in the United States population, while in the aged group the respective percentages were two and five.

In spite of the generally recognized tendency to migrate in family units, males exceeded females in the Mexican population. Between 1920 and 1930, this excess increased from 62,383 to 94,815. At the same time, however, the sex ratio (number of males per 100 females) fell from 120 to 114. This relative increase of females can be accounted for not only by the relatively large number of females entering this country but also by the greater longevity of females.

Although the sex ratio of the Mexican population corresponded closely to that of the foreign-born white population of the United States (114 as against 115), it was much higher than the sex ratio of the total population (103). Disproportionately greater numbers of males were found in states outside the areas of greatest Mexican concentration. Sex ratios of the Mexican population of Arizona, New Mexico and Texas approached the sex ratios of the total population of these states. Males exceeded females in the Mexican population of Ohio, Indiana and Wisconsin by more than two to one.

Since the place an individual attains in the social hierarchy is often dependent upon his occupation,¹³ occupational classification is perhaps the most significant characteristic which distinguishes the Mexican population of the United States.¹⁴ They were first brought into the Southwest to work on railroads and in agriculture but significant penetrations were made into the production of sugar-beets, vegetables, and fruits and, finally, into the mechanical industries of the North.

It is interesting to note that Mexicans came as non-competitive laborers into sections of the United States where unskilled labor was scarce. They were especially adaptable to the commercial

¹³ Pitirim Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1927, p. 99 ff.

¹⁴ Manuel Gamio, *Mexican Immigration to the United States*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1930, p. 51.

types of agriculture prevalent in California, Arizona, Texas, Colorado and Michigan. Approximately 60 per cent of the 100,000 contract laborers needed in the sugar-beet producing areas are at present Mexican.¹⁵ Many of the problems of the Mexican population can be explained in terms of the unstable and seasonal nature of their work. Both the railroads and the sugar-beet industry, as a rule, need workers from March to October only. Many Mexicans are found to "follow the crops" from Texas through Colorado and Wyoming to Montana and then to return to Texas, California or Arizona for the winter.

According to the 1930 Census, one per cent of the gainfully employed population of the United States was classified as Mexican. Of the population 10 years old and over, 49.8 per cent of the Mexican population as compared with 49.4 per cent of the total United States population was classified as gainfully employed. Thus the percentage of Mexicans employed approximated the percentage of the total national population employed but fell below the 59.2 per cent of the Negro and the 56.1 per cent of the foreign-born white.

The percentages of Mexicans employed in the 10 industrial classes delimited by the Census exceeded those of the United States population in only three classes, namely, Agriculture, Extraction of Minerals, and Transportation and Communication. Eighty per cent of the Mexicans employed in agriculture were farm laborers, all those employed in mining were common laborers, and a large part of those in transportation were section-hands.

Eighty-seven per cent of the Mexican working population was male and 13 per cent female as contrasted with 78 per cent and 22 per cent for the total population. The low percentage of Mexican women working was due partially to the type of work demanded on the railroads and in agriculture and, partially, to factors of geographical and culture inaccessibility which separate the women from suitable employment. In addition some under reporting may be responsible for the lower figure for Mexican women. However, Mexican women exceeded the relative proportion of the total female

¹⁵ *Hearings before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, Part 19, Detroit Hearings, September, 1941, p. 7873.*

working population of this country in each of three industrial classes, namely, Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mechanical Industries, and Domestic and Personal Services. Ninety-five per cent of Mexican women engaged in agriculture were farm laborers, and a large part of those in manufacturing and mechanical industries were manual laborers. Those employed in domestic and personal service were most frequently laundresses, waitresses, and housekeepers.

In those classes usually accepted as including the upper occupational strata such as Public Service, Professional Service, Trades, and, to a lesser degree, Clerical, Mexicans were extremely rare. Generalizing it is apparent that Mexicans tended to concentrate in the lower strata of the socio-economic hierarchy and few attained employer and owner status.

It seems pertinent at this point to digress briefly from strict demographic analysis and to suggest some of the implications divulged by the data on occupation because of their relevance in present day affairs. Basically our democratic ideal implies freedom from limitations imposed upon the individual solely because of race, sex, or creed and assures to all freedom of occupational choice and educational opportunity. In regard to the latter the 1930 Census revealed that only 52 per cent of the Mexican population 5 to 20 years of age was attending school in contrast to 70 per cent for the total population of the United States.

Of course this index of educational opportunity is crude but it takes on particular significance when augmented by statements such as the following:

The economic status of sugar-beet families, the attitude of the community into which they migrate, their inferior social status, and the fact that they have been traditionally of foreign extraction, all combine to place their children in a disadvantaged position. Many communities have not cared whether or not the children of beet laborers attended school, and have made no pretense of enforcing the school attendance laws with regard to them. Parents of sugar-beet families are frequently of foreign birth, are illiterate, and do not even speak English. Mexican sugar-beet workers are isolated socially from other groups in the community, their children are not permitted to become assimilated into the American culture in the traditional fashion.¹⁶

¹⁶ Included in a report by the Labor Division, Farm Security Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. *Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration*, Part 19, Detroit Hearings, Sep. 23, 24, 25, 1941, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1941, p. 7897.

In 1930, 28 per cent of the Mexican population 10 years old and over was illiterate, that is, not able to read and write in any language. The illiteracy rate for the total United States population was 4 per cent, or one-seventh as high. Further pointing up the problem the 1930 Census reported 55 per cent of the foreign-born Mexican population 10 years old and over is unable to speak English.

At a time when the nation is in need of all available labor to wage a war it is important to consider what might be done to bring the Mexican population of the United States into more complete participation in the effort. In order to bring this about it is necessary that some of the barriers to educational opportunity and occupational choice among Mexicans in the United States give way. Potentialities of this segment of our population are only suggested in a recent study of graduates of the New Mexico Schools for Vocational Training for War Production. By September 1942 approximately 3500 Spanish-speaking males had graduated from Vocational Training for War Industries schools and were engaged in skilled trades in wartime activities.¹⁷ Average hourly wages of 85 cents and average monthly wages of \$148.00 were reported. Most of the skilled workers who were placed outside the armed forces were born in rural villages.

¹⁷ Charles P. and Nellie H. Loomis, "Skilled Spanish-American War-Industry Workers from New Mexico," United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. November 1942. p. 3.

The Solution of the Madagascar Problem.* A Study in Imperial Adjustment.

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The war is over—except for the neutrals was the caustic comment of the United States Consul in Madagascar.¹ The war (1883-85) to establish French authority in the island by supplanting British influence was directed against the Hovas, a Polynesian people claiming sovereignty over the other Malagasy tribes.² The treaty terminating the war (17 December 1885) provided that the French government acting through a Resident General "will represent Madagascar in all its foreign relations."³ It provided further for extraterritoriality, freedom of religion, and an indemnity. The magnificent roadstead of Diego Suarez—large enough to shelter a battle fleet—went to France for control and development. The Hovas, on their part, agreed to treat with *bienveillance* the Sakalavas, a native tribe friendly to the French but unfriendly to the Hovas. In turn, the French government promised to protect Madagascar and not to interfere in domestic matters. Finally, and especially, Hova sovereignty over the entire island was recognized.⁴ The Hova negotiators excluded the word "protectorate" from the treaty on the grounds that it would compromise their independence.⁵

The treaty was signed to close out a remote and troublesome enterprise. But for the difficult campaign in Tonkin, France would never have signed a treaty so inadequately defining her authority.⁶

* Follows "the Genesis of the Madagascar Problem" by the same author in *Quarterly*, December 1942.

¹ Robinson to Porter, 16 Feb., 1886, *United States Consular Letters*, vol. iv, no. 187.

² See G. Downum, "The Genesis of the Madagascar Problem," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, December, 1942.

³ An interpretative letter of doubtful validity perhaps limited the treaty.

⁴ Treaty of 17 December 1885, *Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires de Madagascar*, 1884-86, no. 57. (cited as *Mad.*, 1884-86).

⁵ Patriomonio to Freycinet, 20 Dec. 1885, *Mad.*, 1884-86, no. 51.

⁶ *London Times*, 27 Feb. 1886; Patriomonio to Freycinet, 20 Dec. 1886, *Mad.*, 1884-86, no. 51. France was adding Tonkin to her colonial empire.

Nonetheless, Premier Freycinet notified the powers that it "is henceforth the definitive rule of international relations between the Hova government and foreign governments."⁷ By this treaty the Anglo-French controversy over Madagascar was only limited and redefined, while basic forces continued to operate. French imperialists continued to desire the extension of French authority in the island, while Hova leaders, supported and even aided by English missionaries, sought all possible freedom for their government. English statesmen, faced with the weakening of English influence, sought to salvage such trading and extraterritorial privileges as they could. A resulting decade of controversy ended with French annexation in 1896.

The point of departure for this study is the failure of the 1885 settlements fully to define the new regime. France controlled foreign affairs—but where did foreign affairs end? Were the Hovas independent except for foreign relations? Who controlled consuls? What was the place of French culture and government, language and religion in a land where the English had conducted education? How trustworthy was the French announcement that the treaty would not affect foreign capital?⁸ The defects of the treaty appeared in controversies over the recognition of consuls, over concessions and commercial privileges, and over the personal safety of foreigners. France had three alternatives. She could abandon Madagascar—a course unthinkable for her prestige-minded governments; she might patch here and tinker there, blundering along from incident to incident; finally, she might establish an unqualified protectorate or even annex the island. Actually the Quai d'Orsay muddled along for a decade until three developments enabled it to impose a full protectorate. A three cornered deal in 1890 eliminated England; a decade demonstrated the futility of the quasi-protectorate; and a militant imperialism developed in France.

After the treaty of 1885 trade and shipping restrictions were slowly relaxed.⁹ The Hova indemnity was arranged only after

⁷ Circular to French ministers, 11 Mar. 1886, *Documents diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914*, Series I, vol. VI, no. 207.

⁸ Circular to French ministers, 27 Dec. 1885, *Mad.*, 1884-86, no. 54.

⁹ Robinson to Porter, 16 Feb. 1886, U. S. Consular Letters, vol. iv., no. 187.

the Quai d'orsay forestalled the Hova plan to avoid contracting a political mortgage in France by borrowing in England. Whitehall acquiesced. "It has not been considered compatible with the general policy of her Majesty's government and the necessity of keeping on good terms with France," a British spokesman said significantly, "to expand British influence in Madagascar or to give much support to the Hova government."¹⁰

The exequatur struggle between England and France over their respective positions in the island began soon after the arrival in May 1886 of Le Myre de Vilers, the French Resident. A former governor in Indo-China, he needed all his notable tact and patience, for the natives were restless and their premier promptly informed Vilers that he was no part of the Hova government.¹¹ The British Vice-consul, the Reverend V. C. Pickersgill, a confirmed Franco-phobe, violated his instructions against supporting the natives against the French.¹² Vilers accepted existing exequaturs but in 1887 when a new British consul applied to him for an exequatur, the native premier protested this step as a "virtual recognition of the protectorate of France over Madagascar."¹³ The affair dragged on for four months until the patient Vilers by severing relations with the Hovas forced a compromise by having the exequatur endorsed "affairs . . . having a political character will be presided over by the French Resident."¹⁴

In Anglo-French rivalry over Madagascar there was little of importance until the major territorial settlements of 1890. Forced labor, slave trading in Arab boats under French registry, and the liquor traffic aroused some resentment in Victorian England and contributed to the world wide feeling of Anglo-French tension. In

¹⁰ Roseberry to Lister, 21 July 1886, Howe, Sonia, *The Drama of Madagascar*, 272.

¹¹ Howe, *Madagascar*, 271; Pickersgill to . . . 23 July 1886, *Ibid.*, 725. Vilers tried to be conciliatory, *Ibid.*, p. 276. *Madagascar Times*, 25 Dec. 1886.

¹² Lister to Pickersgill, 21 July 1886, Howe, *Madagascar*, 272, 277. d'Aubigny to Freycinet, 20 Sept. 1886, *Doc. dip. fr.*, ser. 1, vol. vi, no. 315.

¹³ Pickersgill to Foreign Office, 15 May 1887, Howe, *Mad.*, 278.

¹⁴ *London Times*, 7, 27 Aug. 1887. Grandidier, Guillaume, *Le Myre de Vilers, Duchesne, Gallieni: Quarante Années de l'histoire de Madagascar, 1880-1920*. The affair striking England with little force did not strain Anglo-French relations. Waddington to Freycinet, 13 Aug. 1887, *Doc. dip. fr.*, Ser. 1 Vol. VI, no. 284; Salisbury to Lyons, 20 July 1887, Newton, *Lord Lyons*, Vol. II, 410.

1890 five European governments, England, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal, partially abated their colonial rivalry by a general African settlement in which Madagascar played a part. France had established herself in French Somaliland, Tunis, Algeria, and West Africa in positions alternating with British holdings on the Senegal, Ivory, and Niger coasts. Some ambitious Frenchmen saw all French areas north of the Equator pushed toward the hinterland until they joined in a solid block from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea, from Aden to the Atlantic. Only Tripoli and Egypt (still disputed with England) might be excluded. With this extravagant imperial dream, English policy definitely clashed; for English expansionists hoped for a British rather than a French West Africa, and looked, moreover, to linking together Egypt, the Sudan (when retaken from the natives) and North Africa. The reconquest of the Sudan while France was occupied with the pacification of Madagascar, and the Fashoda incident are intelligible in terms of Anglo-French continental rivalry. Between the Sudan and South Africa lay the present Kenya and Tanganyika, bounded on the west by the Belgian Congo and claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar. Britishers and Frenchmen were busy here, some officially, others not; after 1885 German agents too were active. The resulting claims were partly reconciled in a series of settlements by which Madagascar entered the story of the partition of Africa.

In 1886 a preliminary settlement was reached by a mixed commission from England, France, and Germany which awarded Pemba, Zanzibar, and a narrow strip of coast line to the Sultan of Zanzibar, and divided central East Africa into German and English spheres. There was a rumor, unsubstantiated in documents, that the French share was Madagascar. Actually, little remained there for negotiation, thanks to the failure of Granville and Gladstone in 1883-85. Without consulting the Quai d'Orsay England and Germany reached in 1890 an East African agreement which strengthened that of 1886 and transferred Helgoland to Germany in return for her recognition of a British protectorate in Zanzibar. Frenchmen at once complained of being ignored in the councils of Europe; and alleged that England had violated an old Anglo-French agreement to respect the independence of Zanzibar.¹⁵ Soon a general

¹⁵ *Debats parlementaires, Chambré*, 1890, vol. II, 536, 563, 845, 918.

African settlement was under way. When it was rumored that England would renounce her rights in Tunis to obtain French recognition of the recent Zanzibar agreement, Count Crispi—to whom any increment of French power in Tunis was unpalatable—intervened by getting Count Hatzfeldt, the German minister in London, to urge Salisbury to compensate France in Madagascar.¹⁶ Salisbury, wrote Hatzfeldt, "fully shared the views I expressed, namely, that compensation for France would have to be sought in Madagascar."¹⁷ French demands to be so compensated were (1) Issuance of Madagascar exequaturs through the French Resident, (2) examination of English and French claims to the Lake Chad region by a commission, and (3) a commercial agreement for Tunisia. Points one and two caused no difficulty; but commercial pressure groups in England prevented restriction of British interests in Tunisia.¹⁸

Finally all arrangements being completed, on 5 August 1890 joint declarations were exchanged. For her part, France recognized the English protectorate in Zanzibar with full protection for missionaries and guarantees of religious freedom and the rights of individual Frenchmen. Similarly England recognized the French protectorate in Madagascar "with its consequences, especially as regards the exequaturs of British consuls and agents." Religious freedom and the rights of individual Englishmen were also guaranteed. This understanding included the delimitation of Nigeria and French West Africa.¹⁹

These agreements the French foreign minister, Ribot, asserted before the Chamber of Deputies confirmed and extended those of 1885.²⁰ Salisbury characterized them as a mere recognition of the status quo, both England and France being confronted with a *fait accompli*.²¹ Nevertheless, "it was with something like consterna-

¹⁶ Marschall to Hatzfeldt, 26 June, 1890, *La Politique exterieure de l'Allemagne*, vol. VIII, no. 1437.

¹⁷ Hatzfeldt to Marschall, 27 June, 1890, *Ibid.*, no. 1438. Cf. also Ribot to Waddington, 25, 26 June 1890, *Doc. dip. fr. Ser. I, Vol. VIII*, no. 95, 96.

¹⁸ Hatzfeldt to Foreign Ministry, 16 July, 1890, *La Pol. Ext. de l'Allemagne* Waddington to Ribot, 22 July 1890 *Doc. dip. fr. Ser. I, Vol. VIII*, no. 127.

¹⁹ Declarations of Waddington and Salisbury, 5 Aug., 1890, *Documents diplomatiques, Affaires de Madagascar*, 1885-1895, no. 4. In November the German government accepted these declarations.

²⁰ *Debats parlementaires, Chambré*, 1890, *Session extra*, 210.

²¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, 11 Aug., 1890, vol. 348, p. 456.

tion that British Christians learned . . . that Madagascar was to pass under the protectorate of France," remarked *The Christian* (London). "The policy of the French colonial authorities is inimical to Protestant missions."²² Frenchmen also sensed this religious rivalry. "We have in the great African island two enemies," remarked *La Geographie*, "English and Arab, Protestantism and Islam."²³ As for the Hova premier, he and his fellow countrymen were "distressed beyond measure to learn that England after an unbroken period of friendship and good will . . . is thrusting them into the hands of their enemies; they know not why they should be thus treated, seeing that they have honestly made efforts to open the resources . . . to British enterprise, and they plead for that sympathetic treatment which a weak nation . . . has a right to expect . . . of the strong."²⁴

Actually the arrangements of 1890 are a turning point, for although administration changed little, feelings changed much. In Madagascar robbery, murder, insults, obstructionism, armament all multiplied so rapidly that within four years the French Resident could no longer guarantee the safety of his nationals. War followed. This war, which France was all the more willing to undertake since England in 1890 had renounced whatever obligations for Hova quasi-independence she may have borne, is an aspect of Anglo-French rivalry. The drift toward war become marked with a renewal of the *exequatur* struggle when the United States and Germany both sent new consuls in 1891 and a new British consul appeared in 1892. For years the German and British consuls were *sans exequatur*, whereas the American compromised as acting consul.²⁵ In this way the quarrel of a great power with a nebulous native government over the symbols of a somewhat illusory control complicated the normal relations of three powers.

Anglo-French rivalry and the deterioration of Hova-French relations appeared also in the question of extraterritoriality. English and the United States nationals were alarmed over a French pro-

²² *Missionary Review of the World*, Dec., 1890, III, p. 949.

²³ Quoted by Capt. S. P. Oliver, in *London Times*, 25 Sept., 1890.

²⁴ Pickersgill to Salisbury, 20 Sept., 1890, Howe, *Madagascar*, 279.

²⁵ Waller to Quincy, 25 Aug., 1893, *U. S. Con. Letters*, VIII, no. 66; Wetter to Stroble, 26 Jan. 1894, *Ibid.*, no. 6; *Parl. Deb.*, 25 March, 1894, vol. 22, p. 315; Bayard to Gresham, 16 March, 1894, *U. S. State Department, Despatches, Great Britain*, vol. 176, no. 183.

posal in 1891 to make all aliens in Madagascar subject to French courts.²⁶ England was glad to cooperate, Salisbury wrote realistically "in establishing a state of affairs which, while safeguarding completely the rights (of) British subjects . . . (in) Madagascar, shall correspond with the position which . . . the French Republic has acquired in that country."²⁷ But Salisbury in trying to limit the proposed jurisdiction of French courts strengthened Hova obstructionism.²⁸ French courts were in fact established in 1892 but—in the colorless language of the *Statesmen's Yearbook*—"The Hova government is opposed to these (jurisdictional claims), and no attempt has yet been made to carry them into effect."²⁹

Anglo-French rivalry took other forms. Victorians had a conscience especially relative to slavery, liquor, and the White Man's Burden. It was galling, then, to many Englishmen as well as to many natives who had worked against the traffic to see France fail to repress the slave trade. Religion, too, figured in the rivalry. "The agents accredited by England are not precisely those who make the most opposition in Madagascar; those are bound to the cause of the Methodists and English merchants . . ." ³⁰ In the Chamber of Deputies an ardent colonist charged that the English missions "oblige the Hova government to continue its policy . . . of the complete expulsion of France."³¹ This complex situation is not lacking in irony. The anti-clerical France of Ferry, Clemenceau, and Victor Hugo promoted Catholicism in the colonies to support and expand the empire; meanwhile, the non-conformists of England, rebels against the establishment of religion, had through the London Missionary Society created an influential, quasi-established Hova church. Although traditionally members of the anti-imperialist Liberal Party, they stood unsuccessfully for

²⁶ A similar proposal was made for Britain in Zanzibar.

²⁷ Salisbury to Waddington, 16 May, 1892, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 89, p. 1036. Cf. U. S. State Dept. memo., Addes to Quincy attached to Waller to Wharton, 25 April, 1893, U. S. Consular Letters, VIII, no. 53. "The eventual supremacy of the French in Madagascar is a foregone conclusion, which it is not incumbent on us to avert or contest."

²⁸ Waddington to Salisbury, 10 June, 1892, *Br. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 89, p. 1038.

²⁹ *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1895, p. 518.

³⁰ Bonnemaison, J., *Historique de Madagascar*, 155

³¹ *Débats parlementaires, Chambré*, 1893, II, 281.

a strong policy in Madagascar. It was an atavism suggesting mediaeval Catholic internationalism for English Protestants to urge Protestants in France to oppose French imperialism to counter the work of French Catholics in Madagascar.

After all, it was difficult to further the French regime in a country friendly to England and accustomed to her language and culture. In seeking to entrench his regime economically, the Resident General found English business men and concession-hunters more avid than the French and in better standing with the natives; indeed, until the conquest of 1896 the native government itself made it difficult for Frenchmen to get concessions.³²

Our analysis of the drift toward the war of 1895-96 must perforce include the growth of two other factors, namely, Franco-Hova hostility and French imperialism. Since most governments have no scarcity of incidents available for exploitation, we must evaluate with caution the many French complaints of native trouble—footpads are not always native patriots. It is clear, however, that the source of considerable native unruliness was dislike of the French. This disorder and the arming of the Hovas confronted the French with the alternative of increasing their power or withdrawing. Finally, there was a feeling of the inevitability of war after 1890. The French and Hovas had irreconcilable purposes; they differed over the questions for which men willingly fight.

By April, 1893, the Hovas began war-like preparations.³³ The native premier defended his right to buy arms;³⁴ there were echoes in the Chambers³⁵ and Resident General Larrouy, arguing the futility of small actions, urged a march on the capital in force.³⁶ In January, 1894, the anti-French Hova premier announced publicly a "defense" program.³⁷ Some English nationals insisted that

³² *Debâtes parlementaires, Chambré*, I, 1892, p. 524-38, passim; *L'Afrique française*, Nov. 1892, p. 8.

³³ Waller to Wharton, 25 April, 1893, *U. S. Con. Letters*, viii, no. 53.

³⁴ Larrouy to Develle, 3 Nov., 1893, *Mad.* 1885-95, no. 26; *L'Afr. fr.*, Oct. 1893, p. 12; *Ibid.*, Nov., 1893, p. 7.

³⁵ Casimir, Perier to Larrouy, 26 Jan., 1894, *Mad.* 1885-95, no. 31; *L'Afr. fr.*, Feb., 1894, p. 14; *Debâtes parlementaire, Chambré*, 1894, pp. 92-94.

³⁶ Larrouy to Casimer-Perier, 26 Jan., 1894, 7 Feb., 1894, nos. 30, 32.

³⁷ Larrouy to Casimer-Perier, 20 Feb. 1894, *Ibid.*, no. 34. *L'Afr. fr.* July, 1894, p. 99.

France would never act vigorously. It was necessary, Larrouy decided in June, 1894, to act at once or not at all. Even before his decision was known in Paris, the French cabinet had urged him to obtain execution of the treaties and to gain time.³⁸ In September, 1894, with the cabinet's approval he withdrew. Meanwhile, Vilers returned as Resident General on a special mission to establish an unqualified protectorate or to break with the Hovas and evacuate the French.³⁹ Since it was clear that the Hovas would not peacefully accept an unlimited protectorate, Vilers' mission was patently a device to gain time until the French Parliament might be brought to support a second Franco-Hova war.

The cabinet's expectation of support may be attributed in part to a profound shift in public attitudes toward imperialism, credited chiefly to three men, Jules Ferry, Eugène Étienne, and Theophile Delcassé. *Le Temps* put it neatly, "It is not understood at the Silver Palace (Hova capitol) that public opinion is no longer, as in 1885, indifferent or hostile to all colonial military action."⁴⁰

The Hova premier did not properly assess this stiffening of attitudes when he rejected Vilers' demands in October.⁴¹ Britishers and native flatterers assured him that swamps, forests, and fever would destroy the French who, as in 1884, would fight a half-hearted war.⁴² Perhaps he knew that some French businessmen in the island objected to a forward policy as injurious to their business.⁴³ Finally he feared that his political enemies and native chauvinists would oust him from office if he made concessions.⁴⁴ Risking a rupture, he rationalized about foreign aid.⁴⁵ So Vilers 13 December 1894 on direct orders from Paris,⁴⁶ retired to Tamatave, the island's chief port.

³⁸ Hanotaux to Larrouy, 20 July, 1894, *Mad.* 1885-95, no. 39; Larrouy to Hanotaux, 25, 27, 30 June, 1894, *Ibid.*, nos. 36, 37, 38. *L'Afr. fr.*, July, 1894, p. 99.

³⁹ Hanotaux to Larrouy, 9 Sept., 1894, *Mad.*, 1885-1895, no. 46; Hanotaux to Vilers, 12 Sept., 1894, *Ibid.*, no. 47; *London Times*, 11, 14 Sept., 1894.

⁴⁰ Quoted in *London Times*, 10 Nov., 1894.

⁴¹ Vilers to Hanotaux, 26, 28, Oct., 1894, *Mad.*, 1885-1895, no. 42, 53.

⁴² *London Times*, 10, 14 Sept., 1894.

⁴³ Wetter to State Dept., 30 Sept., 1894, *U. S. Con. Letters*, VIII, no. 51.

⁴⁴ *London Times*, 3 Sept., 12, 24, 25 Oct., 1894. *Br. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 86, p. 1080.

⁴⁵ Vilers to Hanotaux, 5 Nov., 1895, *Mad.*, 1885-1895, no. 55.

⁴⁶ Hanotaux to Vilers, 8 Dec., 1894, Vilers to Hanotaux, 13 Dec., 1894, *Ibid.*, nos. 58, 9. *London Times*, 17, 19 Dec. 1894. *Madagascar News*, 19 Dec., 1894.

Premier Hanotaux' launching of this war is a story of executive control of legislatures and public attitudes. Since it was well known that the cabinet would demand heavy credits for an expedition⁴⁷ the public was prepared by a series of announcements stressing the seriousness of the Madagascar problem. On 13 Nov. 1894, Hanotaux in demanding from the Chamber of Deputies the necessary credits rehearsed the shop-worn story about the disappointments of the protectorate, pictured France as the good uncle of the unappreciative Malagasy and summarized the Vilers' mission. Carefully he showed that the agreements of 1890 allowed France a free hand. A few jibes at England slipped into the debate; and the Chambers were assured that a Madagascar expedition would not weaken French defenses against Germany.⁴⁸ The appropriation was passed by the Senate almost without question.⁴⁹ Two comments by the London *Times* are suggestive. Since the projected Madagascar war cannot cause a general conflict, the *Times* cynically remarked, "England as a lover of peace may quietly look on" and thus avoid generating ill will in France.⁵⁰ Secondly, it is for Frenchmen to determine if it is worth conquest for "we have acquiesced in the French protectorate of Madagascar."⁵¹

Everything being in readiness, Hanotaux had told Vilers to go ahead. Tamatave was seized and the coast blockaded—to the great disgust of traders.⁵² The Hovas were led for a while by English volunteers against whom the Foreign Enlistment Act was not invoked.⁵³ Apparently some supplies were smuggled from England

⁴⁷ cf. note no. 44, also, London *Times*, 5, 13 Nov., 1894.

⁴⁸ *Debats parlementaires, Chambré, Session Extra*, 1894, pp. 241-8, 263, 379, 434-53, 466. The vote on the credits was 390 to 112; *Revue du Droit Public*, 1895, I, 310; *L'Afr. fr.* Dec., 1894, pp. 190-212; London *Times*, 16, 19, 23, 24, 26, Nov., 1894.

⁴⁹ *Debats parlementaires, Senat, Session Extra*, 1894, pp. 178-91. London *Times*, 30 Nov., 7 Dec., 1894.

⁵⁰ London *Times*, 15 Nov., 1894.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 28 Nov., 1894.

⁵² Hanotaux to Vilers, 8 Dec., 1894, Vilers to Hanotaux, 13 Dec., 1894, *Mad.*, 1885-1895, nos. 58, 59. London *Times*, 17, 19, Dec., 1894. *Madagascar News*, 19 Dec., 1894.

⁵³ London *Times*, 24, 27 Dec., 1894; 5, 22 Jan., 1 June, 14, 15 Aug., 28 Sept., 1895; *Journal des Debats*, 2 Jan., 1895; *L'Af. fr.*, Jan., 1894, p. 4, *Ibid.*, May, 1894, p. 149. *Parl. Debates*, 7 Feb., 1895, vol. 30, p. 180; *Ibid.*, 14 June, 1894, vol. 34, p. 1158. Burleigh-Bennett. *Two Campaigns: Madagascar and Ashantee*, 104, 211.

and it was generally believed that English missionaries aided the native government with advice. The war which was short and decisive, was terminated when General Duchesne entered the capital, 1 October, 1895, with 5000 troops.

Salisbury did not harrass the French as his predecessor Granville had done during the first Malagasy war. He surely realized that it was as difficult to pry the French loose from Madagascar as for the French to inch the British out of Egypt. Nonetheless several question hours in the Commons touched on the Government's policy of effacement and of neutrality.⁵⁴ This policy, complained Wardlaw Thompson the secretary of the London Missionary Society, permitted injustice for the sake of self-interest, might cost England the friendship of the Malagasy, hinder civilization, and expose British subjects to native reprisals. Salisbury could not act vigorously for he faced the general elections of July, 1895, a Turkish crisis, the troublesome Irish, the critical Venezuelan question, difficulties with the Boers, and the perplexities of the Sino-Japanese War. In view of this encirclement of embarrassment, the Conservative Salisbury might well thank the Liberals for having established a negative policy toward Madagascar.

In France the war, generally popular, was supported by powerful pressure groups such as the Comité de Madagascar⁵⁵ and the Comité de L'Afrique française which during 1895 mentioned in its journal thirteen new books on Madagascar. A conference on the Malagasy problem at the Ecole des Hautes-Études Commerciales stressed the need of disrupting British preponderance in the Indian Ocean. Plainly, the days of bounding anti-imperialism was gone.

French enthusiasm and the difficulties of the campaign led Hanotaux secretly to discard his old policy of obtaining a strong restatement of the 1885 treaty; he now demanded an unilateral act of submission.⁵⁶ But his new instructions arrived after Duch-

⁵⁴ *Parl. Debates*, 7 Feb., 1895, vol. 30, pp. 180-37; 15, 18, 21 Feb., 1895, vol. 30, pp. 834, 956, 1265; 21 March 1895, vol. 31, p. 1547; 8, 9, 23 April, 1895, vol. 32, pp. 1149, 1289, 1491; 30 May, 1895, vol. 34, p. 652; 13 June, 1895, vol. 34, p. 1058.

⁵⁵ Established 1894, it had 1200 members; merged with the Union coloniale française, 1896.

⁵⁶ Hanotaux to Duchesne, 18 Sept., 1895, *Mad.*, 1885-1895, no. 63.

esne had concluded in October a treaty based on his old orders.⁵⁷ Although the Duchesne treaty was received well in France, a noisy group demanded stronger stuff, even annexation.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, Hanotaux was supplanted by Pierre Berthelot who, influenced by the annexationists and Hanotaux's secret instructions, repudiated the Duchesne Treaty. Then in a curious jumble of legal terminology he told the chamber that France had taken possession of the island. Soon *prise de possession* was implemented by several actions: transfer of Madagascar from the Quai d'Orsay to the Colonial Ministry, the imposition of French law on all aliens, the exile of the native premier, and the appointment of Hippolyte Laroche as resident general with almost sovereign powers.

On 18 January 1896 Laroche obtained from the Hova queen an unilateral act of submission which superseded the Duchesne treaty and in February the powers were notified that France had taken definitive possession of Madagascar.⁵⁹ Since this action and semi-official statements threatened non-French trade, the governments of England and the United States protested.⁶⁰ In April Salisbury began to learn what *prise de possession* actually meant—the French tariff would apply to Madagascar and French courts would replace consular courts.⁶¹ He then protested stoutly and suggested the reciprocal withdrawal of French consular courts from Zanzibar.⁶²

This protest, ironically enough, contributed to the French annexation of the island. The Laroche treaty had its critics. A protectorate acceptable to some was considered by annexationists and anti-slavery groups as too limited; finally, Salisbury insisted that

⁵⁷ Duchesne to Hanotaux, 7 Oct., 1895, *Ibid.*, no. 65.

⁵⁸ *London Times*, 11, 12 Oct., 1895; *Bulletin de Comité de Madagascar*, Nov., 1895, I, p. 389; Paul Leroy, "La Colonisation française," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1895, pp. 132, 349-81.

⁵⁹ Circular to French ministers, 11 Feb., 1896, *Documents diplomatiques, Affaires de Madagascar*, 1896, no. 3.

⁶⁰ Courcel to Salisbury, 22 Feb., 1896, *Brit. and For. State Papers*, vol. 89, p. 1045; Salisbury to Courcel, 20 Feb., 1896, *Ibid.*, p. 1045. Olney to Patenotre, 26 Feb., 1896, *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1896, no. 42. Other powers did not protest.

⁶¹ Geoffray to Salisbury, 10 April, 1896, *Brit. and For. State Papers*, vol. 89, p. 1047.

⁶² Salisbury to Dufferin, 25 April, 1896, *Ibid.*, p. 1046, *Parl. Deb.* 25 April, 1896, vol. 37, p. 1628.

annexation did not void existing commercial treaties. Meanwhile Hanotaux, now back in office, withdrew from the converging pressures with accustomed nimbleness. The old advocate of a protectorate, the father of the Laroche plan, he proposed annexation as "the clearest, simplest, most logical method, the only one fitted to dispel the obscurities enveloping the future of Madagascar."⁶³ The Chamber approved in June by a vote of 329 to 82, and the Senate concurred without dissent.⁶⁴ Annexation was proclaimed 6 August, 1896. The press in Paris except the *Journal des Débats* applauded.⁶⁵

The French government proceeded to establish superior courts and to regulate the arms traffic.⁶⁶ The German government complained over the loss of most favored nation treatment.⁶⁷ Salisbury was adamant in insisting that British rights could not be tossed aside by the legerdemain of annexation. This annexation was different, he held, for it had been understood that France would only establish a protectorate; moreover, the French notification accompanying the 1885 treaty and the agreements of 1890 had both safeguarded English rights.⁶⁸ A tiresome line of protests followed.⁶⁹ In August he did offer to withdraw consular courts when French courts in Zanzibar were closed.⁷⁰ So Madagascar was once more linked with Zanzibar. Another tussle in September and the matter was dropped for nearly a year.⁷¹ Several factors influenced this retreat—the withdrawal of U. S. protests,⁷² the gradual and gentle application of French tariffs to

⁶³ *Debats parlementaires, Chambré*, 1896, 11, pp. 73, 305, 324. *London Times*, 1 June, 1896.

⁶⁴ *Debats parlementaires, Chambré*, 1896, 11, pp. 305, 328-47; *Senat*, 1896, 11, p. 350-357. *London Times*, 22 June, 13 July, 1896; *L'Afr. Fr.*, August, 1896, p. 24; Dufferin to Salisbury, 21 June, 1896, *Brit. and For. State Papers* vol. 89, p. 1060.

⁶⁵ *Journal des Débats*, 1 June, 1896; *London Times*, 7 June, 1896.

⁶⁶ Decrees of 6, 9 June, 1896, *Brit. and For. State Papers*, vol. 88, pp. 827, 1233.

⁶⁷ *London Times*, 4 June, 1896.

⁶⁸ Salisbury to Dufferin, 11 June, 1896, *Ibid.*, p. 1059.

⁶⁹ Salisbury to Howard, 4 Aug., 1896, *Brit. and For. State Papers*, vol. 89, p. 1071. Salisbury feared the establishment of a dangerous precedent rather than the loss of trade; Salisbury to Ford, 15 July, 1896, *Ibid.*, p. 1068.

⁷⁰ Courcel to Salisbury, 18 Aug., 1896; Salisbury to Courcel, 27 Aug., 1896, *Ibid.*, 1074.

⁷¹ Salisbury to Dufferin, 14 Sept., 1896, *Ibid.*, vol. 89, p. 1077.

⁷² Rockhill to Patenotre, 12 Aug., 1896, *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1896, no. 71.

Madagascar, and English public attitudes. It was a "delusion in France that English public opinion is jealously eager to magnify the difficulties of French government in Madagascar. Neither in the Press or in Parliament has any serious protest been raised . . . The dominion of France has been unreservedly recognized by Great Britain . . . subject, of course, to treaty obligations."⁷³

The French government continued to consolidate and implement its authority. Under General Simon Gallieni, governor-general (1896-1905), the island was pacified, French authority established, and missionaries conciliated. Reversing the old policy of seeking to rule through the Hovas, Gallieni destroyed Hova suzerainty, exiled the queen (February, 1897) and restored tribal autonomy. It was a masterstroke, destroying the chief center of French resistance, the seat of English influence, and a frequent cause of local wars. His system of association or collaboration of races was based on the "oil stain" method—the gradual spreading of influence from small centers. He firmly established French influence in every field the British had entered since the 1840's—education, religion, trade, government. It was another Egypt—with Britain rather than France losing ground.

The dormant Anglo-French feud was revived in March, 1897, when Salisbury in complaining of some difficulties experienced by Britishers in the island, reminded Hanotaux that his old protest was still unanswered.⁷⁴ Hanotaux's reply included a reluctant agreement to close French courts in Zanzibar when those of England were operating. He added a hope—perhaps foreshadowing the Entente Cordiale of 1904—"that this transaction might be the first step in the settlement of all outstanding questions."⁷⁵ Probably this was sugar on a pill, for a few days later the entire French tariff system was extended to Madagascar to the great danger of the remaining British trade. Now Salisbury even intimated his regret for not actively interfering with the French forward policy

⁷³ London *Times*, 12 Sept., 1896. Note the significant phrase reserving treaty obligations.

⁷⁴ Salisbury to Monson, 9 March, 1897, *Brit. and For. State Papers*, vol. 90, p. 1079; *Parl. Debates*, 22, 23 March, 1897, vol. 47, pp. 1117, 1171.

⁷⁵ Monson to Salisbury, 14 April, 1897, Salisbury to Monson, 22 April, 1897, *Brit. and For. State Papers*, vol. 89, pp. 1085-87.

of 1895.⁷⁶ But Salisbury's complaints could only delay adjustment. Hanotaux wisely dropped the correspondence.⁷⁷ The Madagascar question was on its way to settlement as other questions—West Africa, the Fashoda crisis, the Boer War, Morocco—replaced it. Although at times employed for name calling or for politics, the Madagascar issue ceased to be vital.

When Theophile Delcassé became foreign minister in June, 1898, Salisbury vainly attempted to reopen the question.⁷⁸ Yet the issue outlived the Fashoda crisis, lying dormant until the negotiations for the Entente Cordiale of 1904. Meanwhile, Frenchmen were busily supplanting English trade in the island by their own.⁷⁹ While the Madagascar question lay quiescent Anglo-French rivalry, after the excitement of the Fashoda crisis, began to metamorphose into an Anglo-French equilibrium. Finally, the efforts of Delcassé, Lansdowne, and Sir Thomas Barclay made a settlement possible.⁸⁰ In 1903, Lansdowne and Delcassé began earnestly to adjust their differences over Siam, the New Hebrides, West and East Africa, Newfoundland fisheries, Egypt, Morocco, Madagascar, and Zanzibar. Apparently, in September, 1903, in the negotiations for the Entente Cordiale, Lansdowne, in sketching a general settlement, offered to withdraw English claims and protests respecting Madagascar if France accepted Britain's dominant position in Zanzibar.⁸¹ Happily Delcassé assented.⁸² On 8 April, 1904, Lansdowne and Delcassé, prodded by the Russo-Japanese War which had begun

⁷⁶ Monson to Salisbury, 26 April, 1897, Salisbury to Monson, 30 April, 1897, *Ibid.*, vol. 89, pp. 1088, 1090.

⁷⁷ cf. Statement in Parliament, 27 March, 1899, *Parl. Deb.*, vol. 69, p. 506.

⁷⁸ Salisbury to Monson, 20 July, 1898, *Brit. and For. State Papers*, vol. 90, p. 476; Salisbury to Monson, 13 Aug., 1898, *Ibid.*, p. 489; Salisbury to Monson, 26 Nov., 1898, *Ibid.*, p. 505; Le Myre de Vilers, "Le Livre bleu," *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, 1899, II, 133. Monson feared that the Madagascar issue might hinder French ratification of the West African agreement of 1898—Monson to Salisbury 4 August, 1898, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, vol. I, no. 359.

⁷⁹ English exports to Madagascar fell from L 34,000 in the first quarter of 1897 to less than L 10,000 in the first quarter of 1897. *Parl. Deb.*, 17 May, 1900, vol. 83, p. 408. See Note 84.

⁸⁰ Barclay as secretary of the English Chamber of Commerce in Paris was an indefatigable worker for Anglo-French conciliation. Cf. his *Thirty Years of Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876-1906*.

⁸¹ Lansdowne to Cambon, 1 Oct., 1903, *Br. Doc.*, vol. II, p. 316.

⁸² Lansdowne to Cambon, 19 Nov., 1903, *Ibid.*, no. 376. Also New Hebrides question was settled then.

in the preceding February, signed the sheaf of agreements constituting the Entente Cordiale. That concerning Madagascar was brief. "In view of the agreement now in negotiation on the questions of jurisdiction and the postal service in Zanzibar, and on the adjacent coast, His Britannic Majesty's Government withdraw the protest which they had raised against the introduction of the customs tariff established at Madagascar after the annexation of that island to France. The Government of the French Republic take note of this Declaration."

In Madagascar Britain had given up, against a counterpoise in Zanzibar, "merely a verbal protest against the conquest and a consequent exclusive tariff."⁸³ It was time for reconciliation. All, or nearly all, Britain had sought had become irrelevant or irretrievably lost. With the pro-English queen and premier gone a restoration of British influence was unlikely even if French control was relaxed. Though British missionaries had lost their influence over the native government, they were safe, and able to work, and probably the number of Protestants was growing. Even English traders found peace and order, though their trade was all but gone.⁸⁴ Now that France was an ally, why worry about French naval bases in Madagascar. In effect, the old diplomacy had adjusted a major problem of pre-war imperialism.

The French did relatively little with their prize. In an island almost a thousand miles long only about 16,000 miles of auto roads (dry season only) and some 600 miles of railway have been completed. Not quite an eighth of the natives are Christian—and of these three-fourths are protestant. French firms have now about three-fourths of the island foreign trade.⁸⁵ The peace time garrison comprises only 5,300 men, native and European. Although Diego Suarez has an important dry dock, it is hardly a great naval base.

⁸³ *Parl. Deb.*, 1 June, 1904, vol. 135, p. 501.

⁸⁴ In 1904, 1.7% of Malagasy imports and 4% of exports were British. *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1906, p. 89. Arthur Girault, *The Colonial Tariff Policy of France*, p. 221.

⁸⁵ Imports in 1938 were \$17,347,000, of which 75.4% came from France and 5.3% from the United States and 2.5% from England; of \$23,583,000 in exports, 78.4% went to France, 5.6% to England and 5.4% to the United States. *Encyclopaedia Britannica World Atlas*, p. 197.

Madagascar, like St. Pierre and Miquelon, ceased to be a factor in Anglo-French rivalry for four decades. After the blitzkrieg installed an anti-British government in France, tension over Madagascar revived, especially with the development of air bases such as Tulear and with more activity at Diego Suarez. When officials in Madagascar refused to sever relations with Vichy, Britain began a very quiet blockade in October, 1940.⁸⁶ Perhaps nervous officials in London, Berlin, and Tokyo remembered how the Russian fleet of 1904 was sheltered in Madagascar enroute to the Far East. As the South Pacific war developed and the route to Suez around Africa became more important, the island's strategic value grew. There were many rumors of a projected Japanese seizure which would not only endanger United Nation shipping but might weaken the Smut's government by encouraging the pro-Nazi opposition party whose members liked to point out that much of the Union of South Africa is within bombing range of Tulear.⁸⁷ Indeed, a Free French general in Washington urged that the United States rather than England occupy the island, for the French hardly trusted the English,⁸⁸ and in the House of Representatives, Carl Hinshaw of California urged United Nations occupation to forestall the Axis.⁸⁹ Finally, on 4 May, 1942, British troops seized Diego Suarez and after overcoming considerable resistance proceeded to occupy the entire country. The Free French cooperated and are now entering into the administration.⁹⁰ Is it not irony that Diego Saurez, the portion first seized by France in 1885 was the first to be taken by the British whom Washington is supporting more eagerly than it did forty-five years ago?⁹¹ At last the British aided by the Free French are back in Madagascar but with guns instead of Bibles; probably their control will be exercised through soldiers and administrators rather than informally by missionaries; yet like their missionary predecessors, it seems they support in a new version, *la mission civilisatrice*.

⁸⁶ *New York Times*, 30 Sept., 1940, p. 1; 10 Oct., 1940, p. 6. There were rumors that British landing parties were repulsed, *Ibid.*, 30 Sept., 1940, p. 1.

⁸⁷ *Christian Century*, 20 May, 1942, p. 652.

⁸⁸ *New York Times*, 2 May, 1942, p. 5.

⁸⁹ *Congressional Record*, 21 April, 1942, p. 3684.

⁹⁰ *New York Times*, 9 May, 1942, p. 28.

⁹¹ See statement of Sumner Wells, 5 May, 1942, in *New York Times*, 5 May, 1942, p. 1.

Analysis of Frontier Social Instability

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To Americans the frontier is a land of romance. Both literature and folklore picture it as a world that was different—a place of excitement and adventure. In his short stories, Bret Hart carries the reader into the frontier mining regions, making Roaring Camp and Poker Flat as vivid as the historians make Bunker Hill and Bull Run. In fireside tales, the older persons relate stories of pioneer ancestors winding their way westward through the forest, across the plains, and over the mountains to build their homes in the Red Man's land. On every hand there is evidence that America loves its "wild and woolly West." A group of western story editors reports that there are perhaps ten times as many readers of western stories as there are of any other type of fiction—¹ *Western Trails* and *Wild West Weekly* being among the Nation's best-selling newstand magazines. The movies fascinate thousands each year by portrayals of thrilling action and picturesque scenes of the frontier, such as *The Trail of the Lonesome Pine*, *Jessie James*, and *Dodge City*.

Distance lends enchantment; and, as a point of actual fact, the romanticism of the pioneer life has been largely "read in" by the generations that have succeeded the frontiersmen, somewhat by way of giving due credit to those hardy and courageous men and women who "hewed the Nation out of the wilderness." As historians know, there was, for the early settlers, little in the way of romance; there was in fact nothing but stark reality—myriads of hardships and disappointments.

The problem at hand is that of examining this frontier instability. For this purpose the term "frontier" cannot be defined as it is by the Bureau of Census—a place that had a population "density of six persons per square mile." On the contrary, it means the conditions wherein "pioneers were forced, for the sake

¹ Western story editors to Webb. Quoted from Walter Prescott Webb, *The Great Plains*, 467.

of survival, to make new adjustments to raw environments"—² the circumstances wherein new-comers, had a "self-sufficing economy and the crude living conditions and uncouth manners of the less complex cultures."³ And the term "instability" means not merely a dynamic society but the absence of a clearly defined social pattern—the circumstances wherein the settlers lacked an integrated social order.

Carl Becker demonstrated quite effectively in his *Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* that the most effective means for developing an understanding of present day society or any aspect of it is to go back to the earliest point and to examine historically and analytically to the present. The problem at hand lends itself to this methodology. The program of study is, first, to set forth the facts regarding the character and extent of the instability; second, to make an analysis—a theoretical examination—of the forces that caused the instability; and, third, to determine, if possible, wherein the forces that account for the instability are now reflected in and operative in American culture. This paper does not pretend to be a comprehensive treatment of the subject. It ignores the first and third elements. Even the second element—the making of an analysis, or theoretical examination of the forces that caused the instability—is set forth in only outline form.

The speed with which population swept across North America after the Revolution is paralleled by no other immigration in the world's history. The frontier life of any given region of the present United States was short. The movement from the Atlantic coast "shot forward in projecting tongues of settlement, leaving unoccupied areas in the rear."⁴ To use another figure, people moved westward in successive waves which rolled until they reached the ninety-eighth meridian, where the Great Plains area checked them. But, after the California gold rush of 1849, another series of waves began rolling eastward from the Pacific Coast. Following the close of the Civil War the eastward-moving and the westward-moving

² James G. Leyburn, *Frontier Folkways*, 1.

³ Rupert B. Vance, *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, Vol. VI, p. 503.

⁴ Eggar B. Wesley, "The Army and the Western Movement," *Minnesota History*, Vol. XV, 1934, pp. 377-78.

frontiers rushed rapidly toward each other to a meeting about 1890;⁵ and this converging of the two waves of migration closed the American frontier.

The movement to the frontier was unlike the migration to an old and stable society. Immigrants who came to the Atlantic Coast during the middle of the nineteenth century to make their homes were received into a comparatively stable and developed society, i.e., the situation was already defined. Irrespective of the fact that persons of diverse cultures immigrated to the area at that time, they were molded, blended, and controlled by the coastal social order. The situation on the frontier, however, was quite different. Those who pioneered to the wilderness found no stable social order to receive them. They passed into a land that was the home of the savage Indians, the deer, and the buffalo and was devoid, almost if not entirely, of white inhabitants. The frontiersman, instead of migrating to a society where the situation was already defined, had to define it himself and had to work out a social relationship by his own initiative.

To define the frontier situation or to establish an integrated social order meant the working out of a new way of life, the outlining of a new social pattern. In the first place a homogeneous group did not migrate to the frontier; but, on the contrary, representatives from many societies—Germans, English, Irish, Swedes, Massachusettsians, and Carolinians. Every state and nation converged on "the hither edge of free land" in the midst of wild Indians.⁶ Those of each nationality thought at first in terms of their own respective social patterns and could not understand the social patterns of the others. The English could not understand the Germans' beer drinking and lax observance of the Sabbath. The Irish had customs that were obnoxious to the Swedes. The pioneers from Massachusetts thought those from Carolina queer. An atmosphere of suspicion and fear hung between the Indians and the Whites. Instead of one group's converging on the frontier to lift a harmonious voice to define "the man as he should be"—to borrow Sumner's expression—there were many discordant cries, which

⁵ Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History*, 1.

⁶ A study of a cross section of the frontier states and territories as reported by the 7th and 8th United States Census confirms this idea.

often separated individuals from each other as effectively as the barriers of oceans and deserts. In this situation it was impossible for the many elements of the new-comers' respective cultures to form themselves immediately into a clearly defined and well ordered social mechanism.

The frontiersmen had also to adjust themselves to the physical conditions of the new area, which were often in marked contrast to those of the part of the world from which they came. If the westward movement had been only a gradual drifting of the population from the settled areas adjacent to the frontier, the contrast in respect to geographic conditions would not have been so perceptibly abrupt. But the westward movement was something more than a migration of individuals from the settled areas into the frontier just across the border. It was a moving of representatives of every state and nation—of every climate and topography—to the "cutting edge of civilization." In a general way, the geographical circumstances were to these new-comers often entirely different from those they had previously encountered. For example, Scandinavians, whose original homes were in the cold mountainous land of the midnight sun, perhaps came to live in the sultry Mississippi Valley—the land of malaria. Or Georgians and Carolinians, who were accustomed to mild conditions of the Old South, came to live on the cold wind-swept Illinois Prairie. Since by force of circumstances, most of the migrants were croppers or ranchmen, the different geographical conditions, however slight they may now seem to historians, presented the frontiersmen with momentous specific problems. For example, the Frenchman who knew how to produce wine grapes and olives had much difficulty adjusting himself to the production of tobacco and corn. Or the Carolinian who was accustomed to the production of rice, cotton, and indigo, obviously had trouble becoming a rancher.

It is necessary at this point to stress this matter of physical environment. Historians cannot neglect the fact that the geographical circumstances of a region is an important factor in shaping the cultural framework of its inhabitants. For obvious reasons, the forces of nature play more directly and, thus, more intensively on man under the conditions of a primitive culture than under the circumstance of an advanced culture. The social set-up

of a region at a given time "registers the gain of trial and error for the ages, and gives man handy tools and weapons, folkways, or customs which make life easier and smoother for him." ⁷ Hell to the Eskimo came to be a place where it is dark, cold, and stormy; but to the Jew, living in regions of high temperature, it came to be the place where it is extremely hot. "Buddha, born in the steaming Himalayan piedmont, fighting the lassitude induced by heat and humidity pictured his heaven as Nirvana, the cessation of all activity and individual life." ⁸ Variations of climatic conditions in the United States account in part at least for variations in the cultural patterns. Just as the excessive cold influences the mannerism of those living in the extreme North, so the intense heat influences the behavior of those dwelling in the deep South. It is thus that, to one observer, "America seems to be subdivided into large provinces of a comparatively unified character, provinces out of which there would undoubtedly have grown in earlier days and under different conditions separate cultures." ⁹

Furthermore, the frontiersmen often had to adjust themselves to new economic circumstances. The societies from which many of these people came were in terms of economics, highly developed capitalistic societies. But on the frontier, they had first to proceed with subsistence farming—somewhat self-sufficient individual economic units. Goods were not bought in abundance from New York and Singapore or from France and Germany. On the contrary, most of each man's goods were of his own production—the result of his own effort and ingenuity.

Credit institutions were rarely extended to the "cutting edge of civilization." Not being able then to write a check for a horse and cow or to pay dollars in silver or currency for tobacco and salt, the frontiersmen had to work out a new system for transactions. In colonial New England, the wampum was used as a medium of exchange. In Massachusetts, "in 1635, musket balls were made receivable up to 12 pence in one payment; five years later maize was made current at the stipulated rate of 4 shillings a bushel,

⁷ R. Mukerjee, *Regional Sociology*, quoted from Rupert B. Vance, *Human Geography of the South*, 14.

⁸ Robert L. Sutherland and Julian L. Woodward, *Introductory Sociology*, 627.

⁹ Vance, *Human Geography of the South*, 15.

wheat at 6, peas at 6, rye at 5, and barley at 5."¹⁰ Upon one occasion, George Washington stopped at an inn and bought a glass of wine for which he handed over a beaver skin. He received as "change" more rabbit skins than he could comfortably carry. After the adoption of the Constitution, there was still evident scarcity of money on the border country. Acres of land were exchanged for horses and cows; syrup, for corn; whisky, for preachers' sermons.

It is true in a fashion that advancing frontier settlements did make possible that expansion of business enterprise which is essential to the capitalistic economic process. And, thus, as long as the frontier obtained, the United States did not become involved in so-called capitalistic imperialism—the addition of foreign territory, the search for wider foreign markets, and the expansion of the American business into foreign lands. But the point here is that this capitalistic way of life did not appear at the "cutting edge of society," or at the time of the establishment of the early settlements. The establishment of the capitalistic way of life was, in fact, the passing of the frontier.

It is at best a difficult problem for persons of various cultural strains living under unfamiliar geographic and economic circumstances to work out for themselves an integrated social order. But on the American Frontier there were at least three supplementary complicating factors. In the first place, many of the people who went to the frontier were not the usual "run of the mill" in their native homes. In the second place, the frontiersmen by necessity lived lonely isolated lives. And, in the third place, there was the ever-present conflict between invading Whites and retreating Indians.

Great numbers of adventurous, eccentric, and lawless persons, as well as other types of misfits, migrated to the raw environment. This area was the haven of refuge for the counterfeiters, desperados, robbers, and horse thieves. The man who avoided the shotgun wedding in the East could go where there were no officers or insisting fathers. To persons disappointed in love or seeking adventure the frontier extended an open invitation. These individuals did not fit any social pattern. They had gone to the

¹⁰ Walter W. Jennings, *A History of Economic Progress in the United States*, 78-79.

"cutting edge of civilization" to escape the social control of the environment from whence they came; and they were reluctant to give up their freedom and to form an orderly social mechanism. Thus, in addition to the failure to fit into a pattern, these types actually hindered and obstructed the evolution of a cultural pattern.

It is difficult to visualize today the extreme isolation that many of the frontiersmen experienced—not the secondary matter of isolation caused by cultural barriers, but the primary matter of physical isolation. The frontier was sparsely populated, the distance between families was great, and the roads were often only blazed paths through the forests. Travel was mainly by walking, riding horseback, or driving wooden-wheeled wagons. In spite of the romance which has clustered around his name, the frontiersman led a solitary life. One English traveler described the circumstance of the solitary life:

It is a feeling of confinement which begins to dampen the spirits, by this complete exclusion of distant objects. To travel, day after day, among trees of a hundred feet high, without a glimpse of the surrounding country is oppressive to a degree which those cannot conceive who have not experienced it; and it must depress the spirits of the solitary settler to pass years in that state. His visible horizon extends no farther than the tops of the trees which bound his plantation, perhaps five hundred yards. Upwards, he sees the sun, and sky, and stars; but around him an eternal forest, from which he can never hope to emerge.¹¹

The long days of summer and the dreary days of winter were spent in looking at the forest, the clouds, the snows and in listening to the sounds of animals, the flowing streams—yes, all this in its rarest beauty; but there were not many people to meet. One passed days and even weeks without being able to see one's nearest neighbor or a traveler. Loneliness was intensified by the lack of reading material—few novels, almost no magazines, and no evening paper thrown off near the front door. The settlers necessarily had few opportunities to get together and, thus, to become acquainted, to forget their differences, to evolve a body of integrated folkways and mores. The frontiersmen were thus forced to live within themselves.

Since the Whites felt that they had the "natural right" to take

¹¹ William Newnham Blane, *An Excursion through the United States and Canada during the Years 1822, 1823, 1824-1825*.

the land and did take it, the Indians fought the invaders valiantly. As a result, many of the frontiersmen lived in constant danger of attack. They came thus to have no more scruples in regard to killing an Indian than they had in regard to killing a wolf, and the clash between the two races was an awful realism.

It is not suggested that people consciously establish an institutional framework. It is in the "rules of thumb," the folkways, the mores, that the social pattern is set, in so far as it is fixed at any given time. In other words, the cultural mechanism flows from the common sense of the age; and, like Topsy, the rules of thumb, the folkways, the mores, the common sense "just grew up." Man does not establish them by carefully weighing the situation and deciding how to conduct himself. On the contrary, the habits and patterns are formed by accident, by trial and error, by suggestion. After falling upon ways of doing things, man comes to accept those ways as "right," "just," and "good." Failure to conduct oneself in accordance with the "right" results in his social disapproval. Certain folkways are, in the course of time, elevated to a "higher level" and thus become mores. Finally the entire common sense, etc. comes to be set in authoritative position in the affairs of men—viz., in religion, jurisprudence, and philosophy. William Graham Sumner wrote that:

By autosuggestion the stronger minds produce ideas which when set afloat pass by suggestion from mind to mind. Acts which are consonant with the ideas are imitated. There is a give and take between man and man. This process is one of development. New suggestions come in at point after point. They are carried out. They combine with what existed already. Every new step increases the number of points upon which other minds may seize.¹²

And he continues:

It is of the first importance to notice that, from the first acts by which men try to satisfy needs, each act stands by itself, and looks no further than the immediate satisfaction. From recurrent needs arise habits for the individual and customs for the group, but these results are consequences which were never foreseen or intended. They are not noticed until they have long existed, and it is still longer before they are appreciated. Another long time must pass and a higher state of mental development must be reached, before they can be used as a basis from which to deduce rules for meeting, in the future, problems whose pressure can be foreseen. The folkways, therefore, are not creations of human purpose and wit. They are like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation, or they are like the instinctive ways of animals, which are developed out of experience, which reach a final form

¹² *Folkways*, 19.

of maximum adaptation to an interest, which are handed down by tradition and admit of no exception or variation, yet change to meet new conditions ¹⁰ still within the same limited methods and without rational reflection or purpose.¹³

br No institutional framework ever reaches the point that it is entirely and precisely static. Always there is an element of the dynamic, in that modifications are constantly being made, in accordance with the changed circumstances that present themselves—particularly in accordance with the technological changes that come. Old rules of thumb, old folkways, old mores are constantly giving way to the new, as the circumstances that gave rise to the old are giving way to the new. It is true, as Mandeville so effectively pointed out in *The Fable of the Bees* (1723), that the new come into being ¹¹ only as the result of extreme forces of necessity. But always ¹² gradually and occasionally suddenly the old common sense passes. ¹³ and then, even the authorities,—the religion, the jurisprudence, ¹⁴ and the philosophy—are changed, redefined, rewritten.

-q. When a people has in a manner established its cultural framework—i.e., when the rules of the society have been drawn up so ¹⁵ that there are, for a time, only gradual and slight modifications, each individual that comes on the stage to pass his three score and ten orders his life more or less in accordance with those rules. “The individual, because of the ever present surveillance of the social environment, in matters invented by human beings themselves, becomes so completely tuned to the life of the group that he thinks chiefly in terms of group opinion.”¹⁴

In escorting a lady, a man walks between the lady and the street because such position is dictated by the society as being “correct,” not because, as formerly in London, the lady’s clothes may become splattered with the mud of the street. In early Connecticut, where the Christian religion was yet in part functional, no one “ran of a Sabbath-day, or walked in his garden, or elsewhere, except reverently to and from church,”¹⁵ because such action was the established “right and good.” The idea that man and woman may live together as husband and wife only after they have been formally

¹³ *Ibid.* 3-4.

¹⁴ Paul H. Landis, *Social Control*, 77.

¹⁵ *The Blue Laws of Connecticut*, Quoted from Blane, *An Excursion through the United States and Canada during the Years 1822, 1823*, 461-64.

married, with due ceremony, yet obtains as one of the mores in that society yet insists that such is "right." A high degree of kindness and humaneness and of sacredness of human life are characteristic of a given age and culture because the idea has been planted deep in the minds of the group. Socrates would not leave his death cell, even though he was urged to do so by the jailer. The voice of the community of Athens murmured in his ears like the sound of the flute: "'Listen, Socrates, to us who have brought you up.'" Socrates could not betray the respect he so highly esteemed and desired.¹⁶ Sumner states in an excellent passage:

'Custom regulates the whole of a man's action,—his bathing, washing, cutting his hair, eating, drinking, and fasting. From his cradle to his grave he is the slave of ancient usage. In his life there is nothing free, nothing original, nothing spontaneous, no progress toward a higher and better life, and no attempt to improve his condition, mentally, morally, or spiritually. All men act in this way with only a little wider margin of voluntary variation.'¹⁷

It was thus that for a time on the frontier there was taking place—in respect to the rules of thumb, the folkways, the mores, the common sense—a giving way of the old and a rebuilding of a new. There was in addition no institutional set-up complete in detail, as there had been in the old communities from which the immigrants had come. To state the matter in a slightly different way—the people did not move into a place where there was a social arrangement; and for obvious reasons, they could not set up immediately upon arrival a social mechanism approaching perfection. There was, in short, no "complex of organized habits, sentiments, and social attitudes." It was thus that, in the absence of a traditional pattern of action of an established common sense to dictate the way of life, there was a degree of failure in making use of rules of thumb, the folkways, and mores that were applicable in the new environment.

In France during the Revolution there was a collapse of the framework of thought and action that had guided the people for centuries, when the "things that had seemed sacred for centuries were . . . sacred no longer . . ." The lesser clergy were hostile to the prelates; the provincial gentry to the nobility of the court; the

¹⁶ Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 108.

¹⁷ Sumner, *Folkways*, 4.

vassals to the seigneurs; the peasants to the townsmen . . . ' "18 The circumstances of the frontier were comparable in some respects to those of the French Revolution.

The statement, that on the frontier there was only a "child society," is quite meaningful. The bonds of social control were severed; and, thus, the lack of a rationalized and integrated social consciousness caused and allowed each person to act somewhat independently. To state the matter in another manner, "the barrier of respect was down."

The first generation on the frontier can hardly be said to live. "They let life go, throw it away for the benefit of the generation to come after them, and these will be found in most cases to have grown up in such barbarity that it will require one or two generations more to civilize them."¹⁹ There was a general rudeness, a lack of manners, a lack of decorum. The churches themselves often lost almost all holds—schisms occurring, preachers falling into sin, etc. That which is usually called "law and order" was in a large measure absent. "Life was the property of the individual, and not of society, and one man placed his life against another's as the only way of solving hard personal problems."²⁰ Violent death came often, and there was little respect for life itself.

Some one has described frontier instability by saying that the frontier was a place where anything could happen. The reply might well be, "And everything did happen." But at this distance in point of time, the frontier instability appears quite romantic.

18 Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 905-909.

19 Frederick Jackson Turner, *Sections in American History*, 256.

20 Emerson Hough, *The Story of the Outlaw*, 23-24.

Book Reviews

EDITED BY O. DOUGLAS WEEKS
The University of Texas

Bennett, William B., *The American Patent System*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943, pp. vi, 259.)

The scope of this book is broad—from terminology to legal issues to excursions into Chamberlinian and Robinsonian price analysis to a positive program for business regulation. The book is most unique in its application of the theory of monopolistic competition to the domestic and international patent system.

Patents are monopoly *rights* but not monopolies in the true sense of the word because "A monopoly takes something from the people; a patent deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before the invention, but gives the community something of value by adding to the sum of human knowledge." Patents create monopolistic competition but seldom pure monopoly. Product patents are exclusive rights to produce differentiated goods for seventeen years. During this period the firm expands its market and adds an element of oligopoly. Expansion of the market and expansion of the firm's assets together set up a barrier to competition. Even after the original patent expires entry into the industry is prevented by combination of these two monopoly elements. Differentiation, along with oligopoly which is itself the result of market extension, holds out competitors. Patents on production goods or production processes, instead of on the product, decrease unit costs, increase profits, and expand the corporation's assets, automatically excluding competition. When the firm holds patents on both product and process expansion is accelerated and competition retarded. In this setting the author proceeds to analyze the effect of exclusive patent processes upon prices and output.

He assumes that a given firm acquires the exclusive right to exploit a patented process; the effect upon price and output will vary according to the type of license agreement. For instance, license fees amortized over the life of the patent add to the fixed cost of operation but at the same time add at least an equivalent in efficiency for "If the manufacturer could not realize sufficient savings to meet the amortization charge when using the patent, it is unlikely that he would accept the license." At first, total average costs are greater, but with expansion of output total average costs fall below the old unit cost and, assuming that demand remains constant, cause lower prices and greater output. Results are the same,

assuming a flat royalty per unit of output. Tendencies for marginal and average costs to rise are offset by increased efficiency ("c" in the author's equation) and prices have a tendency to fall. If the contract provides for a lower unit royalty as output increases, prices will fall even more than in the preceding case and output will tend to increase more. On the other hand, assuming that unit royalties increase with output, manufacturers are more reluctant to expand and prices retain their rigidity. This is the only one of seven cases where, assuming that demand is unchanged, prices do not tend to decrease with acquisition of the patent.

However, the author allows for cases in which expectations of increased efficiency are not entirely fulfilled, and for cases where the patent differentiates the product, and thus increases demand permitting the firm to sell more goods at higher prices. Most of his cases are illustrated with diagrams of changing cost curves, only one diagram illustrates the effect of differentiation upon demand and price. But this is consistent with the traditional policy of finding price changes in shifting cost curves. In the opinion of the reviewer this analysis falls short for several reasons.

First, it has no application where the patent is used by the inventing corporation itself. Secondly, inadequate emphasis is placed upon changes in elasticity of demand. Differentiation is likely to shift demand to the right but more important than that it increases the *slope* of the curve. One of the primary objectives of differentiation is to increase the slope of the average revenue curve so that the producer can retain all his customers at the prevailing price or raise prices without losing many of them. Third, it is assumed that producers pass the benefit of added efficiency forward in lower prices without considering the effect upon their net profit. Finally, testimonies cited by the author indicate that many patents are purchased but not worked. What is the effect of new costs of this kind upon prices and output?

Some firms, he continues, create separate markets for their output by taking foreign patents. This permits them to sell to different buyers at different prices. "This is known as price discrimination." Patent laws prohibit goods in the cheap market from moving into the dearer market, and the immobility of consumers prevents them from buying in the cheap market. Given this condition the seller will equate marginal revenue in each market with marginal cost for the total output and maximize his profit. Monopoly profits are yielded in each market. But if one of his markets is competitive and the other protected he will earn a monopoly profit only in the protected market where he can sell at a price above the cost of production. Both these illustrations of price discrimination in international trade are reproduced from Joan Robinson's *The Economics of Imperfect Competition*.

Finally, the author introduces his chapter on public interest with the statement that "If the patent system promotes the public interest, it should be retained; if the patent system does not promote the public interest, it should be done away with or modified so that it will effect the desired ends." It is debatable, the author argues, even after the corporation has developed a quasi-monopolistic condition, whether "forced competition or regulated monopoly will best serve the public interest." In some cases the interest of society is served best by retaining and encouraging large-scale production, subject to the order that economies of size be passed on to the consumer; in other cases society is best served by application of anti-trust legislation. In either case, however, he argues that regulation and control should come from adjustment of the government's monopoly policy and not from an alteration or amendment of the patent laws which are fundamentally sound.

This book is a courageous attempt to correlate modern economic principles and business practice. In this respect it is reminiscent of similar efforts in the field of tax shifting. These are the experiments that test our theory, without them we have no measure of validity, but with them we are able to evaluate propositions of economic theory that heretofore have *a priori* either been accepted or rejected. The only criticism that the reviewer has against the book as a whole is that the theoretical aspect of the work is not thoroughly exploited.

The University of Texas

LOUIS K. BRANDT

Rister, Carl Coke, *Land Hunger: David L. Payne and the Oklahoma Boomers*. (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1942. pp. xiii, 245.)

Land Hunger is a portrayal of the principal events in the life of a colorful character and his associates, but it is more than that. It is a vivid and comprehensive account of a daring and exciting frontier phenomenon—the opening of the heart of Oklahoma to land hungry settlers. The frontier thus opened, with surrounding lands, was subsequently added to Indian Territory to form the State of Oklahoma. Dr. Rister by exhaustive and careful use of thousands of items of source material has produced a readable, scholarly, book.

David L. Payne, the Oklahoma Boomer, was a border adventurer who, like Moses, only "saw the Promised Land." He will always be, however, a salient character in the history of Oklahoma. Possessed of personal fearlessness, aggressive and determined, he was an ideal leader for the invasion of the forbidden lands. Unconsciously he was an instrumentality in achieving a result that, in the rapid growth and development of Oklahoma, rebounds to his credit. It is true, though, that his actions considered with regard to their time and conditions were contrary to the

laws of the nation, that they were not performed in the interest of the general welfare, and that the lands which he sought were not exigent to relieve the needs of a suffering people. The public domain was far from exhausted in the seventies and eighties. During the late seventies many western newspapers began to give wide publicity to the fact that a tract of land in the heart of Indian Territory, ceded by the Creeks and Seminoles at the close of the Civil War for occupation by other Indian tribes, had not been occupied or even assigned. These newspapers contended that these "Unassigned Lands," which were later designated as "Oklahoma Lands," were subject to homestead entry. Encouraged by these newspapers, and perhaps by railroads and certain Indians, homeseekers—Boomers—from Kansas border made repeated, systematically organized, but unsuccessful, attempts to colonize this tract. Unsuccessful because government troops had explicit instructions to keep the white settlers out. The attitude of the government was that the land had been ceded only for Indian occupation. Hence, it was faced with the necessity of removing the invaders on each attempt to settle. But they returned in increasing numbers, pointing out that cattlemen, without legal sanction, built fences and corrals and grazed their cattle over the rich prairies of the forbidden lands. One railroad, the Santa Fe, was built across the region and stations were established along the right of way. Payne was so sure of his ground that he repeatedly tried to force the issue into the courts.

In 1889, the United States mollified the objecting Creeks and Seminoles by purchasing title to land which had already been ceded. The tract was then laid out in 160-acre homesteads and the new president, Benjamin Harrison, issued a proclamation throwing open the entire Oklahoma district to settlement "at and after the hour of twelve o'clock noon, on the twenty-second day of April." The "Run," or "Harrison's Hoss Race," which followed has become one of the most dramatized episodes in western history. The book is singularly free from typographical errors and the print is easily read. Its format is excellent and in keeping with the high standards of the University of Oklahoma Press. The inclusion of an adequate index and a comprehensive bibliography, and the evidence on every page of careful research make it a definite contribution to western history.

Edinburg (Texas) Junior College

OHRLAND MORTON

Seashore, Robert H. (Ed.), *Fields of Psychology: An Experimental Approach*. (New York: Henry Holt Co., 1942. pp. 643.)

This book has some very good aspects and some pretty obvious shortcomings. The good will be taken up first. It is, altogether, a readable supplementary text for introductory psychology classes. The divisions

are about what would be expected from recent trends. Of course, certain of us might wish that the experimental testing of some psychoanalytical postulations had been included. For the most part the contributors and their respective fields are well matched and the choice of experiments within a given field represents a fair sample of a wide range of material. With one exception to be mentioned later, the experiments are recent, few having been made more than eight years ago. For the most part, also, the treatment of the several experiments is detailed enough and extensive enough to satisfy those jealous of scientific accuracy.

Some of the contributions are excellent. Robert H. Seashore outlines, in the "Introduction," the various fields and summarizes and synthesizes, in "Systematic Psychology," various points of view in a succinct and yet readable form. Lindsley deals with physiological psychology as one who has done much experimentation along the line he refers to. Williamson's "Vocational Guidance" is handled with ease and skill. Harlow on Comparative, Farnsworth on Social, and Conklin on Abnormal are all on familiar and solid ground.

The main shortcoming of the book is the fact that the parts mentioned below do not show the virtuosity in handling the experimental materials that one might expect. The selection of topics is either not without objection or the interpretational and evaluational rôle is minor or lacking. "Having an expert in the field interpret the methods and findings in print" (p. 3) should aim at a high correlation between the contributors' abilities and interests and the topics selected as most pertinent to the general student. In fact, however, some of the contributors are not specialists in just those fields assigned to them or in just those items of research which they themselves, presumably, chose as representative of the field.

Wolfe would hardly claim Educational Psychology as his main interest. That fact may explain why the fields of experimental educational psychology are represented here by experiments on primary abilities, learning to read (*not* dealing with maturational or emotional factors), the transfer of training, and to a description of The Chicago College Plan. Primary abilities as dealt with belong more properly in general than in educational psychology, and the Chicago College Plan has very little to do with experimental procedures. Musgrave's material in Industrial Psychology is not experimental strictly speaking and deals in large measure with the Humm-Wadsworth Scale, which so far as this reviewer can find out has not been open to experimental check at the hands of others besides the authors. Buxton's experimental interests as judged by his published work and the material he deals with under General Experimental Psychology have little in common. Consequently one is not surprised at his excerpting much and interpreting little. Some of the matters Wellman deals with under Human Development, especially the work on environmental stimulation of mental ability, is highly con-

troversial, but one would never know it from her treatment. Harold G. Seashore's assignment is too wide for him to handle it all expertly. In lieu of late experimental work on play by himself or others he borrows from Lehman and Witty's work published in 1927.

This "Experimental Approach" is not so clear-cut nor so economical a book in giving the experimental purpose, methods, results, and interpretations as "Recent Experiments in Psychology" by Crafts, Schneirla, Robinson, and Gilbert, and older work, but a good deal more experimental and possibly more expert than the present one. Nevertheless, this is a good book which will be useful in many colleges.

Louisiana State University

PAUL C. YOUNG

Bard, Erwin Wilke, *The Port of New York Authority*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. x, 352.)

This is an "institutional biography" of the "first agency in the United States . . . to be created by compact with administrative jurisdiction in two states." It deals especially with the developments leading to the compact of 1921 between New York and New Jersey creating the Port of New York Authority, the efforts of the Port Authority to carry out its Comprehensive Plan stressing joint use and public development to replace competitive use and individual development of freight terminal facilities that were considered detrimental to the commerce of the port, and the role that the Authority has played in the construction of bridges and tunnels.

In December, 1920 the New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission, which had been created by the respective states in 1917, rendered its final report based on a most thorough study of the port of New York. Twelve trunk line railroads had duplicated terminal facilities, each seeking competitively to expand its capacity as terminals became congested and making no attempt to move in the direction of joint use of existing facilities. Building on this report, the New York Port Authority prepared a Comprehensive Plan, essentially a railroad plan, which proposed, among other things, that terminal operations within the port be unified and that an automatic railway system operating in tubes be constructed to clear the waterfront of railroad occupancy.

The efforts of the Port Authority to make effective its Comprehensive Plan under a program of coercion in the face of strong railroad opposition and failure to secure the assistance which it expected from the Interstate Commerce Commission are detailed. Equally ineffective were attempts by the Authority to put its plan into effect by persuasion and by the acquisition of certain facilities.

Meanwhile, the development of motor-truck service has altered certain

basic aspects of the physical plan required to approach more unification of the port. As a result, six bridges and two tunnels under the jurisdiction of the Port Authority have been constructed. Here the author feels that "skill in engineering matched by skill in finance has brought the Port Authority's bridge and tunnel building program to a highly satisfactory conclusion, at least for the present, and to the institution itself an unusual degree of public confidence." Mixed financing, which was "original in the United States with the Port of New York Authority" has provided risk capital in the form of state contributions and provided a margin of safety for bondholders. Another contribution noted was the establishment of a general reserve fund "in which could be pooled the revenues (or deficits) of several facilities" to shift the basis for credit to the whole group of facilities which "made possible borrowing the entire cost of the Lincoln Tunnel without state appropriations."

Secondary functions performed by the Authority, which are considered most valuable in the aggregate, include such activities as are designed to promote the development of the port (a study of food handling and produce markets, the improvement of waterways and prevention of obstructions to navigation, the further regulation of ships carrying hazardous cargoes, the establishment of a foreign trade zone, and the development of drydock facilities) and activities designed to protect the commerce of the port from outside attacks, especially those designed to give competitive advantage over New York by obtaining rail rate reductions.

Some questions relating to the legal status of the Authority are examined and a few criticism relating principally to organization and personnel practices are advanced. The entire study reflects a great deal of careful analysis and presents a well organized and informative treatment of the subject based on original sources.

The University of Texas

HOWARD A. CALKINS

Warren, Harris G., *The Sword Was Their Passport*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943, pp. iii, 286.)

This is a documented historical work with most careful attention paid to facts, those of a most interesting sort. The scene and time are the Southwest at the beginning of the nineteenth century when adventurous fillibusters attacked Spanish power.

The United States, then relatively weak and about to be involved in the War of 1812 with Britain, had a dislike for Spain. Its citizens, on the frontier especially, believed like children that anything was possible if supported by strong desire.

Against such a background the adventurers—Anglo-American, Spanish, Mexican, French and British—made their plans. The first revolt discussed by Professor Warrent is that of Gutierrez, a patriotic but unskillful Mexican. He was aided by Magee, a soldier of fortune from

the United States. Although this expedition against Spanish power in what is now Texas met some success, the Spanish soldiers crushed it.

There were others who followed. Toledo worked hard to throw off Spanish control only to become a turncoat and aid Spain. Herrera, a third Mexican leader, achieved enough success to be called minister. Mina, a Spaniard who had fought against the Napoleonic regime in Spain, only found that the return of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne did not bring liberty to the Spaniards. Led by this ideal, he tried to overthrow the king's power in the New World.

The La Fitte Brothers and the other Baratarians played a role that is not entirely clear today, while as privateers and smugglers they operated from both New Orleans and Galveston Island. At first they were hired to carry out naval operations for the fillibusters, but later they accepted service with the Spanish forces. There were other Frenchmen, refugees from Bourbon rule, who sought to lead rebellions and regain their lost power and wealth.

James Long, an Anglo-American, was the last of the early fillibusters. He hoped to make money from extensive real estate deals that he felt sure would follow his military successes in Texas. He too failed.

It is impossible to rank any of these men with Hidalgo, Bolivar, or San Martin; not only is this true because they were not spectacular successes, but they lacked the unselfish spirit of the greater leaders.

Attention is called to the obscure diplomatic attitude of the United States toward Spain and later Mexico during this entire period. On the surface this nation was friendly to Spain, but there was little in the action of the government to bear this out. Onis, the Spanish minister to the United States, time and again informed the authorities of plots that were being carried forward on American soil against Spain. The government acted slowly and ineffectually against the fillibusters. Shaler, who gave some aid to the Gutierrez expedition, was in some ways also an agent of the United States. The Anglo-Americans wanted the land of Spain and the United States hindered them as little as possible.

The Sword Was Their Passport is a very scholarly work with an excellent map of the locale under condition. Professor Warren closes his fine study with an unusually large bibliography that will serve as a guide to others planning research in this field.

2nd Lt., Air Corps, AUS

CHARLES GERALD FORBES

Crowl, Philip A., *Maryland During and After the Revolution*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1943, pp. 185.)

The book here under review is No. 1 of Series LXI of The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. It is a very meritorious study, amply documented, well organized, and clearly

written. Students and teachers interested in the period will not want to be without a copy of the book.

The author's introduction reveals three main topics or problems for discussion. The first problem is aptly worded as follows: "This period in the political history of Maryland is marked by the recurrence of three problems, the attempted solutions of which form the main subject matter of this study. The first concerns the locus of political power, that is, the problem of *who* should rule. The framers of the state constitution of 1776 sought to preserve, as far as was possible, the aristocratic system of government which had prevailed before the Revolution—a government in which a relatively small class of planters, lawyers, and merchants exercised dominant political control."

The second problem during the period "was that of financing the military operations of the Revolution and the expenses of civil government." In the solution of this problem the House of Delegates, "though itself composed of men of considerable property," won out over the fifteen-member aristocratic Senate and met the problem "by borrowing, by currency inflation, and by the confiscation of British and Tory property."

The third problem was the contest waged over the issuance of paper money, a financial experiment from which the people of Maryland were saved by the aristocratic Senate. To be sure, the Maryland legislature authorized two emissions of bills of credit—the "black money" of 1780 in the sum of £ 50,000 and the "red money" of 1781 in the sum of £ 200,000, but it did not go beyond that point in adhering to the faith in "the doctrine of the political transubstantiation of paper into gold and silver," a statement ascribed to John Jay in writing about the issue of paper money in Rhode Island.

The author throws much light on the political leaders of the time by the information which he gives about them. One sees in new relief or perspective, for instance, such men as Matthew Tilghman, Edward Lloyd, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Charles Carroll, Barrister, Samuel Chase, William Paca, Thomas Johnson, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, and Luther Martin.

The study is divided into an introduction of six pages and six chapters which carry the titles: "Organizing the State Government, 1776"; "The Confiscation of British Property"; "The Collection of Pre-War British Debts"; "The Struggle for Paper Money and Debtor Relief, 1785-1787"; "The Federal Constitution in Maryland, 1787-1788"; and "The Ratifying Convention: Annapolis, April, 1788." An appendix of four pages carries the names, by counties, of the members of the Maryland ratifying convention. A bibliographical note of four pages and an index of thirteen pages complete the volume.

Stein, Charles W., *The Third-Term Tradition, Its Rise and Collapse in American Politics*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xvi, 382.)

Now that the constitutional tradition that no president shall serve longer than two terms has been broken it is fitting that its history be written. This the writer of the volume under consideration has done in a most acceptable fashion. Indeed, he has combined thoroughness and careful historical research with a sound appreciation of the spirit of American politics and an ability to write in a clear and attractive style, and has thus produced a work equally valuable to the historian, the political scientist, and the non-academic reader. His bibliography is comprehensive, and he has employed some hitherto unused sources. There can be no doubt that a contribution has been made to the literature of American politics.

The Third-Term Tradition is divided into three parts, the first two being the most extensive and dealing with the "Birth of the Tradition" and "Attempts Which Miscarried." The first part presents developments from Washington through Jackson and concludes with a chapter entitled "Interlude—The Issue Dormant" covering the era from Van Buren through Johnson when all presidents except Lincoln were elected for only one term. In the second part, the efforts of Grant and Theodore Roosevelt to secure third terms are reviewed in detail as well as the discussions which centered around the possibilities of Cleveland, Wilson, and Coolidge being nominated for third terms. The third part concerns Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Summarized very briefly, the writer brings out very clearly that only Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe supported the anti-third term precedent on grounds of principle. Theodore Roosevelt adhered to the tradition in foregoing a third term in 1908, but abandoned it in his unsuccessful race in 1912. Grant and Franklin D. Roosevelt, the one unsuccessful and the other successful in securing a nomination for a third term, paid no heed to the tradition. Cleveland, Wilson, and Coolidge, the remaining three for whom a third term was within the range of possibility, made no pronouncements in favor of the precedent or by their actions showed no particular respect for it. Only Jefferson, the real founder of the precedent, set forth at length the principles upon which the tradition was established. Grant was the first to challenge the tradition, and, in the words of the author, since Grant's time "it has been all luck and no maneuvering that has kept the no-third term tradition on its feet." "It has been luck in the shape of sickness, deaths, close elections, barely missed nominations, party splits, and even personal whims. During this period not one man has been denied a third term on grounds of a strong and staunch adherence to the no-third term precedent on the part of himself, his party, or the voters of the country." Finally a combination of

circumstances, never before occurring, in the form of a great national crisis, a strong president, and an election year came about in 1940, and Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to break the precedent. It may be added that the book closes with some interesting speculations as to what this departure from precedent may mean in the future.

The University of Texas

O. DOUGLAS WEEKS

Harvey, Ray F. and others, *The Politics of This War*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943, pp. 328.)

The word *politics* is here used in a very broad sense; it is perhaps the technically correct sense, but it is not the one commonly attached to it by the general public. The authors refer to the questions of general policy in regard to the various topics (such as labor, the farmer, big business, and so forth) treated in the book. The distinction is recognized by the editor, Professor Harvey, in that his concluding essay is entitled *The Politics of Politics*, and therein he is dealing with politics in the narrower sense.

This symposium is a valuable survey of the main problems created by the war and our participation in it. It is quite evident that the public knows all too little about many of these matters, and it seems to me the effectiveness of the war effort would be considerably increased if the people really understood the reasons for many of the restrictions imposed upon them. Although these questions are extremely controversial, they are treated with great fairness and detachment for the most part.

It is interesting to note that although the editor of the symposium is an academician, practically all of the other contributors are journalists. There is, of course, some unevenness in the quality of the contributions, but the general level is very high. There is also a certain amount of overlapping, although not as much as perhaps might be expected in a work of this kind.

Over and over again the authors make the point which the impatient public is prone to forget,—namely, that much of the apparent fumbling and confusion attendant upon the war administration is due to the fact that we are, after all, a democracy, and that the foibles and sensibilities of the people must be taken into account in any regulatory policy. Our leaders are simply not free to impose arbitrarily whatever policy seems to be logically desirable regardless of public reaction.

Political interests must be considered and balanced even in war time. Certainly narrow partisan advantage ought to be shoved into the background, but it is simply impossible to adjourn politics entirely because of the war. On the other hand, it is also essential to maintain national unity, and these are the two horns of the dilemma which our political leaders must negotiate.

It is to be hoped that such a book as this will reach a large public. True, some of the statistical material already tends to be obsolescent (the book appears to have been written late in 1942), but the underlying argument is sound and permanent, and it would do immense good if the mass of the people had an intelligent understanding of the problems herein treated.

University of Oklahoma

J. H. LEEK

Robison, Sophia M. (Ed.), *Jewish Population Studies*. (New York: Conference on Jewish Relations, 1943, pp. xvi, 189.)

This volume is a collection of research reports of studies made of the Jewish populations in ten cities: Trenton, Passaic, Buffalo, Norwich, New London, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, Minneapolis, and San Francisco. Each study constitutes a separate chapter, and introductory and summary chapters by the editor are included.

In her introductory chapter, the editor emphasizes the inadequacy of data pertaining to the Jewish population in the United States, pointing out that there is no basis on which sound population estimates for this group can be made. She discusses five methods of gathering Jewish population data: the Census of Religious Bodies; Yom Kippur absence; death rates; sampling methods; and complete or partial enumeration. Of these methods, enumeration appears to be the most satisfactory in terms of accuracy of results, although its cost is likely to be prohibitive, especially if complete enumeration is contemplated. Actually, it is difficult if not impossible to determine very precisely the validity of any of the methods, since there is no available way to check results against an accurate census of Jews.

In all of the studies, the immediate problem of determining who is a Jew presented itself, and apparently no satisfactory solution was reached. Jewishness is something that the individual or the family may or may not claim; hence even under the best of circumstances estimation of the Jewish population is likely to be open to some question.

Only a slight effort is made in the final chapter to summarize the results of the separate studies; thus the conclusions reached by the editor regarding the Jewish populations of the cities studied remain very general in nature. However, since it is explicitly stated at the outset that the primary focus of the volume is on "techniques of securing Jewish population data and, secondarily, on the actual demographic data obtained, rather than on the sociological significance of the traits of the Jewish population in each of the cities," the book is perhaps not open to criticism on the score of too scant analysis and interpretation. The discussions of the several methods presented should prove of considerable interest to the student of population and of minority groups.

The University of Texas

W. GORDON BROWDER

Griffin, Lt. Col. Robert A., (Ed.), *The School of the Citizen Soldier*. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Civilian Defense Edition, 1942, pp. ix, 558.)

The School of the Citizen Soldier, adapted from the Educational Program of the Second Army, when it was commanded by Lieutenant General Ben Lear, consists of four parts: "Geography and World Trade," by W. G. Fletcher, Yale; "The World Crisis," by the Second Army Board; "American History and the Constitution," by Ralph H. Gabriel, Yale; and "The Armed Forces," by the Second Army Board. The book gives the impression of being rather four independent brochures in one binding than a single, unified book. Nevertheless, a connection does exist between the parts, because the first two show the material stakes at issue in the War; Part Three gives an account of the spiritual values for which we fight; and the fourth part tells the reader something about the armed services and the weapons with which we are fighting. This connection is pointed out in the concluding chapter where we are told that the book was prepared in order that American soldiers "might better comprehend the large picture of the destiny in which they are involved." The information in the book would have been more effectively presented had the connection between the parts been made plain at the beginning.

The facts contained in this book are elementary and necessarily general; given in an unadorned and unemotional style. There is no jingoism, no flag-waving; yet the authors assume that America has a Destiny and that we are fighting a just war which we must win. It would profit many a citizen to read this book.

University of Oklahoma

L. N. MORGAN

Evans, G. Heberton, Jr., (Ed.), *Two Manuscripts. I—A Memorial Concerning the Coyne of England. November, 1695. II—A Memorial Concerning Credit. July 15, 1696.* By Charles Davenant. From the manuscripts in the British Museum. Introduction by Abbott Payson Usher. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942, pp. 108.)

Charles Davenant was commissioner of excise from 1683 to 1689 and inspector general of exports and imports from 1705 to 1714. He was elected to Parliament in 1685, 1689 and 1700. The first of the manuscripts was prepared by command of Lord Godolphin and discusses four questions: "Whether if the Money be New Coyned it be Advisable to raise its Values?" "Whether it be Advisable during this War to New Coyn the Money?" "Whether it be possible for us to pay the Armies abroad and carry on Our Forreign and Domestic Trade in the present posture of our Coyn?" "Whether there are any Expedients that may help the Publick till the True Species of Money can be Restored?"

Davenant was opposed to the Whig policies of restrictions on trade. He saw that gold and silver simply measured wealth and that too much could be as detrimental as too little. He believed that volume of production and of trade would insure full employment and prosperity. The presentation of his views is remarkable for simplicity and clarity. He advised against the recoinage of the money. He recommended certain expedients for the solution of immediate problems that anticipate financial devices of centuries later.

The second manuscript is also an extremely logical and practical exposition of the meaning and use of credit.

These two manuscripts have not been published before and the material according to the editor does not appear in any of Davenant's printed works. They are, therefore, of very considerable value.

The University of Texas

CORAL H. TULLIS

Book Notes

Technology and the Economics of Total War (American Council on Public Affairs 1943, pp. 26), by Lyman Chalkley is a restatement of the importance of modern scientific technologies in a profit economy, and the place of scientific technologies in the war time economy of necessity. The author points out that with the coming of the scientific age and the application of science to technology, business men abandoned traditional technology based upon an authoritarian background of inherited and personal experiences, and turned the new technologies to their own account in so far as the new technologies were more effective in producing profits than the old. He then goes on to point out that the profit principle "proceeded serenely in its mathematically precise and beautiful way to pilot business activities" as a "constructive guide" which has "exercised the selective influence" as to what technologies shall or shall not be used, and thereby has determined which goods shall or shall not be produced. That is the equivalent of saying that business men through their decisions to make profits have inhibited the full utilization of the technologies. And so they have. The author goes on to point out that during the war emergency the economy has been obliged to shift from one of profit to one of necessity, and that many of the technologies that had never been put to use during peace times are being brought into play in the economy of necessity. But surely he would not hold that the profit economy has been abandoned; instead, it may be argued, those technologies which had been relegated to the background, because they were unprofitable, during peace time, are now, under the pressure of emergency, high prices, and subsidies raised to the status of profitable technologies. What he did not point out is that the maximum utilization of the technologies is incompatible with the profit motive. He concludes with a suggestion—or prediction—that public agencies will continue on into the post war period the scientific studies that will continue to bring into active use many of the known scientific facts which business has been unable to use profitably in the past. C. C. M.

The Law of Civilization and Decay. An Essay on History. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943, pp. xi, 349) by Brooks Adams with an Introduction by Charles A. Beard, is a reprint of an edition published by the Macmillan Company in New York City in 1896. It is considered sufficiently timely that Professor Charles A. Beard has written a fifty-three page introduction. Brooks Adams belongs to the Massachusetts Adams family. Professor Beard has had access to manuscript materials which throw much light on the actual process of writing the book and show the influence Henry Adams and Brooks Adams exerted on each other. The book appears to have been the result of much intellectual labor and in-

tense deliberation on the part of the author. The thesis of the book is, in brief, that there is a law of history which governs man's rise and fall in civilization. Man is motivated by two principles, fear and greed. So long as fear exists man is creative. Religion, art and culture flourish and absorb his energy. When a certain stage is reached, fear ceases to act and then greed becomes the motivating force. Greed leads to centralization. Economic man takes over and degeneration sets in. The community divides into two classes, a few usurers and a mass of peasantry. The end is destruction or reversion to barbarism. The history of man according to the author has followed this pattern. He attempts to prove his thesis in ten chapters entitled: "The Romans"; "The Middle Ages"; "The First Crusade"; "The Second Crusade"; "The Fall of Constantinople"; "The Suppression of the Temple"; "The English Reformation"; "Modern Centralization" and a "Conclusion." Professor Beard believes that in the course of time a primary place in American historiography will be given to the work of Brooks Adams. C. H. T.

Sidney C. Suffrin's *Labor Policy and the Business Cycle* (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943, pp. 52) carries a rather ambitious title considering the scope and development of the material presented. Considering the scope and development of the material presented. The writer states that the major purpose is to bring to light some of the divergent assumptions and interpretations which have given rise to the different explanations of wages and of the role of wages in the economy. This is an ambitious objective for a space of 52 pages. What is done is to give a very brief statement of the general ideas of certain leading contemporary economists who have dealt with the problem, classified under the orthodox, the purchasing power, and the Keynesian groups of adherents. The chief value of this summary presentation of these theories should be to the general reader not already acquainted with the ideas, but the author has elected to use the technical terminology of their original statement which might be intelligible only to the reader already schooled in economic theory, and who would already be familiar with these ideas. Even so the work should have some helpful influence in creating a more popular understanding of some of the issues involved in the problem although it makes no advance over what is now known of the problem.

J. H. C.

The American Council on Public Affairs has published two complementary volumes on the role of Greece in international affairs. *The Greek White Paper* (Washington: 1943, pp. 121) is issued in cooperation with the Greek Office of Information. It is a collection of diplomatic documents relating to Italy's aggression against Greece. The first of the 183 documents is the Treaty of Friendship signed by the two powers in 1928; the last document is the first communique issued by the Greek

General Staff at the outbreak of the war. Some emphasis is put on the period from the Italian occupation of Albania to Italy's attack on France, but the greatest emphasis is on the diplomacy of the period June to October, 1940. Lt Col. Stanley Casson's *Greece Against the Axis* (Washington: 1943, pp. 150) takes up the story from here, that is, the Italian attack, and carries it down through the British evacuation. The author knows his subject not only as a soldier but also as a former teacher of Greek archaeology and history at Oxford University. His account of the Greeks' resistance to the two invasions is that of a participant-observer. His story is lucid and readable although it makes no pretense at being an authoritative military history of the campaign.

D. S. S.

Wilson's Gee's *The Social Economics of Agriculture* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942, pp. 720) is a refreshing revision of his first edition published ten years ago. This book has much to offer as a textbook for undergraduates—restricted use of figures, carefully selected quotations, and interesting illustrations. The last four parts of the book represent a smooth coordination of Economic Elements, Social Factors, Political Problems, and Rural Institutions. In the section on economic problems enlightening chapters appear on modern problems of farm wages, finance, and insurance. In his analysis of price-determination neo-classical theory of Edward Chamberlin and A. L. Meyers is adapted to agricultural case studies. But the subject-matter also reaches out to the social factors of population trends, rural health, and rural public welfare. This is merely a sample of the breath of his treatment. This is more than a textbook on agriculture, it is almost a survey of social science. The only criticism that the reviewer has to offer is that the book is not long enough to do justice to the multitude of issues raised by the author.

L. K. B.

War Comes to Alabama (Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1943, pp. vi, 141), arranged and edited by Professor Haille Farmer, is a collection of fifteen papers dealing with the effects of the war in Alabama which were prepared by the Governor and other public officials of the state. The Impact of the War on Alabama, Population, Public Welfare, Crime and Delinquency, Public Health, Education, Highways, Agriculture, Business and Industry, Manpower, Public Personnel, State Finance, Local Government, Planning, and Post-war Prospects are the subjects treated. The concluding paper, prepared by Professor Farmer, serves to integrate to some extent the other papers and predicts for the future quarter to half a century sharp depressions alternating with periods of moderate prosperity in agriculture and industry, the more serious consequences of which can be avoided only by taking certain steps which the papers of this symposium suggest.

H. A. C.

Education and the United Nations (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943, pp. 111) is a report of a Joint Commission of the Council for Education in World Citizenship and the London International Assembly. It starts with the disheartening story of the destruction of the educational systems of the occupied countries and recommends several steps for the rehabilitation of these systems in the post-war world. Then it approaches the problem of the reeducation of the enemy countries and examines the various channels that may be used to re-educate the minds warped by the doctrines of the Axis. Finally the authors of the report seek to orient the educator in the post-war world. They assign to education and the teacher a role of vast importance in laying the foundation for the post-war system.

D. S. S.

Walter C. Langsam's well-known book, *The World Since 1914*, has just appeared in its fifth edition from the press of The Macmillan Company. Its twenty-six chapters cover 837 pages, and the bibliography and index contain an additional 107 pages. Part I deals with the World War and Peace; Part II covers the twenty-year period of armistice from 1919 to 1939; Part III deals with national developments from 1919 to 1939; and Part IV, which covers 110 pages, discusses the Second World War through the Casablanca Conference of January 14-24, 1943, and the first daylight bombing of Berlin by the Royal Air Force on January 30, 1943, the tenth anniversary of Hitler's appointment as chancellor.

R. L. B.

The eleventh edition of L. Dudley Stamp's *The World: A General Geography* appeared from the press of Longmans, Green and Company just a few months ago. It should serve a very good purpose in connection with war training courses. It is profusely illustrated and should, therefore, be a very interesting book in the hands of the general reader.

R. L. B.